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# AFRICA IN RUSSIA
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## Three Centuries of Encounters

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## Chapter 8

# "Friendship of Peoples" after the Fall: Violence and Pan-African Community in Post-Soviet Moscow

*Jessica Allina-Pisano and Eric Allina-Pisano*

> Please remember always
> That he, of course,
> Was a Negro by birth
> But an absolutely Russian person.
>
> –Boris Kornilov, *Moia Afrika* (My Africa)

## INTRODUCTION

This chapter presents preliminary findings in a broader project on transnational identities. The project exists in dialogue with a growing body of literature that explores historical and contemporary connections between the global south and other areas of the world that have been marginalized within dominant academic discourses in the Anglophone north. In particular, the project is part of an ongoing reconceptualization of cultural and political maps. As others have noted, both traditional area studies and comparative social science approaches elide important connections among communities in what might be termed the global periphery – areas and people beyond loci of concentrated capital and military power.[1] The compartmentalization required by study of places as defined by the limits of continents or even nation-states, as well as the metropolitan perspective so often adopted in the comparative analysis of multiple states, exclude by definitional fiat study of "globalization from below" – connections and movements among people and places of the global south and east.[2]

Our experience as scholars of post-Soviet and southern African politics and history positioned us well to observe these connections and movements. Here we focus specifically on contemporary Russia-Africa contact. We consider one locus of the African presence in post-Soviet Russia: the African student population at Friendship of Peoples University (in Russian, *Rossiiskii Universitet Druzhby Narodov* or RUDN), known also as Patrice Lumumba University. Our aim at the outset of the research was to examine the ways in which African students created community in Moscow. We sought to avoid the now familiar descriptions of Russian racism and anti-African violence that so often crowd out accounts of any other aspect of African life in Russia. We had little interest in recapitulating the tired trope of Africans as victims, and so we thought to explore the ways in which African students in post-Soviet Moscow established their communities and built networks within them. However, we quickly learned that the processes through which they did so were inseparable from their encounters with racism and violence. Pan-African identity and the social practices that sustain it derive in part from those encounters even as it also reaches beyond them.

Our aim is twofold. We seek an explanation for anti-African sentiment and violence; we also consider the contribution that such sentiments and actions make toward the creation of pan-African community in Moscow. The analysis presented here seeks to avoid both tautological attributions of racially motivated violence to racism and one-dimensional causes rooted in the social and economic upheaval of the post-Soviet period. We analyze discrimination and violence against African students and explain it in terms of Soviet-era legacies as well as the social, political, and economic transformations in the post-Soviet era.[3] We then examine one of the many consequences of that violence: deepened ties across African ethno-linguistic communities within RUDN.

The African presence at RUDN was once explained by a metanarrative that emphasized socialist cooperation. Prior to the dissolution of the Soviet Union, African communities in Russia and Russian communities in Africa participated in state-to-state cooperative programs. African cadres attended Soviet educational institutions to gain the technical skills and knowledge that would help further the aims of socialist revolution in independent (or soon to be liberated) African nations. While that narrative of revolution and transnational brotherhood may have unraveled, individual students still pursue life paths similar to those of previous generations. Their goals are to secure education and training that will permit personal advancement and also contribute toward national capacity-building in their respective home countries.[4] It is difficult to know with much certainty how strongly African students believed in the metanarrative that scripted their role in the Soviet period, but some still associate technical knowledge and progress with institutions such as RUDN.

The benefits of an education at RUDN continue to be a strong draw; strong enough to overcome the isolation, fear, and danger that circumscribe Africans' experience in Moscow. The advantage of the advanced degree

compels students to pursue this life path and even to downplay the less-than-positive aspects of their experiences in the telling of their personal narratives; future generations of students are thus likely to have only partial information about their experiences.[5] Thus, despite their intense awareness of vulnerability, students remain committed to study and progress toward a degree. Most students come from positions of relative privilege in their home countries; while we did not collect data on students' social origins, in most cases merely having completed secondary school and qualifying for university is an indication of relatively elite status. Nonetheless, the opportunity to study in Russia is seen as a powerful form of social mobility. Some students reported that their decision to study in Russia was shaped by the perception that graduates of Soviet universities were "the most well-to-do people" at home.[6] In this respect, students at RUDN have much in common with migrant diasporas the world over – Oaxacans in California, Philippinos in Saudi Arabia, West Africans in New York: a willingness to travel long distances and endure hardship and danger in order to accumulate social and financial capital. The students are part of a broader global temporary diasporic experience.

Amidst continued transnational migration in pursuit of higher education, the past decade has seen an increase in violence – in both scale and intensity – against people of African origin in the Russian Federation.[7] The violence reached the level of spectacle with the burning of a student dormitory at the RUDN in November 2003. The fire was not a specifically anti-African act; many of the students in the dormitory had arrived from China only hours before, and the dead hailed from many countries. However, African students identified it as an effort to assault and terrorize the foreign student community.[8] While official reports attributed the fire to overloaded electrical circuits (allegedly due to female Nigerian students using too many appliances at once), this "official transcript" was received with great skepticism by local observers.[9] Their skepticism must be understood in the context of ongoing violence and threats against foreign students as well as subsequent bomb threats on a neighboring dormitory.[10] While violence is only one thread of a rich tapestry of experience for African students, it powerfully shapes their lives. It constrains their movement, helping define the physical boundaries of their daily world and the social dimensions of their daily experience.

## THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND RESEARCH METHODS

This chapter develops preliminary explanations for a central, if under-researched and under-theorized, question about the experience of Africans in contemporary Russia: Why, in a state with a modern legacy of positive relationships with African nations, do so many African students experience violence – and intense anxiety about violence – as part of their everyday lives in Russian cities? The analysis we present here considers a number of possible answers to this question, including explanations suggested by students currently studying at RUDN. The violence has attracted much attention among human rights groups as well as journalists. The academic literature, where it seeks not only to describe but also to explain the problem, relies primarily on arguments that center on economic and demographic change.[11] Some such explanations often attribute anti-foreign violence to "extreme nationalism" but do not closely examine the sources of such attitudes.[12] We seek to move beyond description of the problem to an explanation that takes into account the dynamic social reality and institutional context that shape attitudes toward outsiders.

The vast literature on ethnic conflict does not provide much purchase in explaining this phenomenon: instances of violence against African students are one-sided attacks, not the result of ethnically based disputes between mutual adversaries making conflicting territorial or other claims. As such most existing theoretical frameworks usually deployed in analysis of interethnic violence do not apply. Conversely, the literature on hate crimes in various national settings often draws on contextual specificity to explain such violence,[13] leaving the escalation of violence against Africans – and other foreigners – in Russia largely unexplained.

This chapter is based on individual interviews and focus groups with students at RUDN in December 2003.[14] Additionally, in June 2004 we conducted in-depth, open-ended interviews in Maputo, Mozambique, with former students of Soviet universities.[15] The current and former students with whom we spoke were primarily, though not exclusively, from Lusophone countries – Guinea-Bissau, Angola, Cape Verde, and Mozambique. In Moscow, we interviewed three non-African students – one from Mongolia, one from Afghanistan, and one from Brazil. The experiences of those students provided a basis for comparison of African and other foreign students' experience as well as allowing us to test the edges of societal apprehension of "blackness."

We conducted interviews and focus-group discussions in Russian, Portuguese, and French. All interviews occurred in multiple languages; following a practice typical of communication in many parts of postcolonial Africa, we and our interlocutors shifted languages within the course of conversation as the nuances of meaning and context demanded.[16] Our interviews with students at RUDN began with a classroom experience. We had been invited by a colleague to deliver a joint lecture and to lead a discussion in a graduate seminar on qualitative methods in social science research. The discussion rapidly turned to managing questions of "otherness" and cultural distance in conducting fieldwork; the linguistic environment in the classroom came to reflect the students' substantive concerns, as they alternated between their native languages and ours (English) in addressing the class. Some of the issues raised in that discussion provided a springboard for questions we later asked in interviews with students.

There are clear methodological limitations in studying the problem of hate crimes through the eyes of victims rather than perpetrators. To understand fully the dynamics of the violence in question, it would be necessary to conduct thorough ethnographic research among skinheads and other groups who openly espouse and act upon xenophobic ideology. However, we wish to place our emphasis on the experience of Africans in contemporary Russia as well as to explore the social and political consequences of those experiences in the formation of pan-African identity.

A more significant methodological problem arises from the lack of a reliable statistical record concerning violence against Africans and other foreigners. One important reason for the absence of such data is that some of this violence occurs at the hands of law enforcement officers. That fact is universally known and experienced among individuals with dark complexions living in or visiting Moscow and has been documented by journalists and human rights advocacy organizations.[17] However, individuals who suffer racial attacks and harassment by law enforcement form an epistemic community that is by definition isolated from mainstream communities. Under such circumstances, the extent of the violence remains largely hidden and unknown – except by those who experience it, their interlocutors, and those who perpetrate it.

## THE TOPOGRAPHY OF VIOLENCE

African victimization at the hands of state and non-state actors in Russia receives sporadic and sensationalized attention in the news media. Whatever its proximate causes, there is little doubt that some anti-foreign violence draws on racial scripts that, through popular culture, engage broader society. Like any other ideology, racism requires ongoing reproduction to survive; the question here is how this process of reproduction has occurred in the post-Soviet period. Here, we provide a baseline description of the types of violence that African students encounter, with the aim of proving a context for our analysis. What follows is a descriptive typology rather than any effort to catalogue acts of violence.[18] The violence and menace that African students experience in Moscow fall into four distinct categories: (i) affective racism and discrimination; (ii) everyday harassment or violence and the anxiety associated with it; (iii) violence as spectacle, including murder and arson; and (iv) official acts of violence, usually involving the police. Each contributes toward students' sense of displacement.

Nearly all the students we interviewed in Moscow reported experiences of racist sentiment and discrimination in daily life.[19] They encounter race-based bigotry in dormitory social life and in the classroom alike. Aside from the social isolation it produces, a number of students emphasized that such racism came as a shock; it was simply something they never expected.[20] While some students downplayed the significance of some instructors' bigotry, others suggested it had a negative impact on their educational experience.[21] More uniform was a sense of social distance from their Russian counterparts and from Russian society.[22] This is not to say that no contact exists: African students acknowledged having Russian friends and intimates, yet still noted a strong sense of socially systematic racism. This is hardly surprising given racism's pervasive social presence – especially within popular culture, which is saturated with negative references to "blacks," including Africans.[23]

Sympathetic or positive references to Africa or to people of African descent within the mass media are rare. One such example may be found in the 1999 pop song *Argentina-Jamaica 5-0*, which presents a Jamaican's lament of Argentina's trouncing of the Jamaican national football team in the World Cup in 1998.[24] However, more representative was the smash hit of the same year, *Ubili Negra* (They Killed a Negro).[25] The song refers to classic stereotypes of basketball, hip-hop, and witch-doctors in its narrative of the murder of a black man. Its opening lines are "a dead snake doesn't hiss/ a dead goldfinch doesn't twitter/a dead Negro doesn't go to play basketball." Little wonder then, that an African student might refer to racism in Russia as part of a social "disease."[26]

Students also reported everyday harassment and violence across the board. The most common accounts were linked to their movements in public spaces such as markets or public transportation. A number of students from Guinea-Bissau stated that they would avoid at all costs going to the market alone; venturing out without companions was "risky."[27] The dangers associated with public spaces have received close attention in media accounts of anti-African violence. Attending a soccer match or going to a movie theater is "a dream" for some students, who fear the attention they might draw.[28] Certain spaces have an especially fearsome reputation, such as the Moscow Metro Zamoskvoretskaia line: "If you want to die, you go there at six o'clock."[29] For students at RUDN, everyday violence leaves physical traces; walking through dormitory courtyards one may pass numerous students with visibly battered faces.[30]

Another form of everyday harassment comes at the hands of law enforcement. As is well known, African students and indeed darker-skinned people in general can expect to be targeted by the Moscow police for document checks. The checks constitute a type of gauntlet that students must run to use public transportation or to move throughout the city. At worst the checks

may come with a beating, short-term imprisonment, or extortion.[31] Yet even in their most benign form, knowledge of what could happen make the experience harrowing.[32]

A third type of violence African students encounter occurs at the level of spectacle. Death threats and murders have become part of students' life.[33] This violence is far less common than the beatings and harassment many students face, but knowledge that it happens to some of their compatriots – and therefore, may someday happen to them – creates an environment of widespread fear. The timing of this research, conducted shortly after the November 2003 fire at RUDN, meant that that incident figured most prominently in accounts of violence. The fire killed forty-two foreign students from various countries and injured nearly 200, with some students jumping to their deaths when they encountered blocked fire exits. The students were recent arrivals and under quarantine – a procedure, our interlocutors noted, imposed exclusively on students from poorer countries – at the time of the fire.[34] The great majority had not yet begun their studies, spoke no Russian, and thus were unable to communicate with rescue or medical personnel.[35] As mentioned above, an official investigation blamed the fire on overloaded electrical circuits; students rejected this explanation nearly across the board.[36] Some reported seeing arsonists pouring gasoline and exiting the building as it went up in flames.[37] Students in neighboring dormitories looked on as fire fighters arrived, after some delay, without access to water and as emergency medical workers demanded payment before transporting injured students to hospital.[38] The fire broke out at three o'clock in the morning and burned for three hours. Nonetheless, classes were held as usual that day. Many professors did not acknowledge what had happened, and some students were informed that absence from class would lower their grade for the semester – even if they missed class in order to visit injured relatives or mourn those killed by the fire.[39]

The fire was neither the first nor the only deadly incident at RUDN. More than a decade earlier a Moscow police officer threatened to "blow away" a Zimbabwean student. The officer then did just that; the shooting was ruled to be in self-defense, but the victim was shot in the back.[40] Nor are such incidents confined to RUDN. Seven African students were killed in the southwestern city of Voronezh between 2000 and 2004.[41] More recently, organized attacks by skinhead groups are reported to be on the rise. The November 2003 fire may not be the last incident of its type. In the weeks following the fire students reported frequent bomb threats, often in the middle of the night. Awakened by police hammering on their doors and hustling them outside, the threats recapitulated the trauma and disruption of the fire.[42] Additionally, just five days after the fire, a group of twenty skinheads attacked five RUDN students waiting at a bus stop in front of the university

– the assailants descending from one bus to initiate the assault and fleeing on the next bus.[43] These incidents weigh heavily on African students at RUDN, one of whom declared: "To study here, you can lose your life in a moment."[44]

Finally, African students at RUDN have learned that they can expect neither protection nor assistance from law enforcement.[45] For the most part, students avoid contact with the police, who "assume that [Africans] are in the wrong." In their experiences, there is little difference between the groups of young men who attack them and the police – except that the police are less likely to assault them while in uniform.[46] Nonetheless, omnipresent police patrols constitute yet another threat to be dodged. Aside from the gauntlet of document inspection that they may encounter, African students face the very real prospect of police assaults. At a meeting of RUDN foreign student representatives, one African reported the following statement from a police officer: "I won't beat you because I'm in uniform. But if I weren't, I'd smack you too."[47] However, not all police officers exhibit such reticence. Several of the African students we interviewed in 2003 described police looking on passively during a skinhead attack on a group of Vietnamese people. Only once other Vietnamese residents in the area arrived to try to fight off the attack did the police intervene, assaulting and arresting the victims while ignoring the instigators.[48]

Overall, students' experiences suggest a profound sense of vulnerability, with such assaults assuming a simultaneously random and chronic character. That vulnerability has a powerful effect in shaping their social world – both in terms of its contours and who populates it. While the proximate consequences are unambiguously negative and require little examination, there are other, almost certainly unimagined, consequences that merit further attention.

## WHY VIOLENCE?

Our interviews with students at RUDN suggested several possible explanations for the violence they and other foreigners experience. In this section we examine hypotheses implicit in students' narratives as well as other possible explanations drawn from the literature on ethnic violence and hate crimes. We focus on three main hypotheses: violence as a punctuated trend spurred by specific political events; violence as an expression of racism predating the end of Soviet rule, but abetted by declining state capacity in the post-Soviet period; and violence as a classic anti-immigrant posture amidst economic crisis or recession. All of these hypotheses contribute some insight into the existence of violence against African students. However, as we demonstrate below, none provide a wholly satisfactory explanation.

We approach this problem primarily through the lens of structural explanations, with an emphasis on ideologies and institutions as central components of the causal story. We do not seek an explanation for anti-African violence that focuses on the motives for individual behavior as such. Rather, we examine social, ideational, and economic shifts in Russian society that may account for changes in the incentives individuals faced – and thus, in the ways in which violent racist behavior is manifest.

One global narrative regarding the proximate origins of racialized violence posits such attacks as a punctuated trend linked to specific political events. Here, two sets of events figure prominently in analysts' observations as well as in students' causal stories: the wars in Chechnya and the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States. The dynamic relationship between terrorist tactics used by people fighting a war of secession (or waging *jihad*, as the case may be) in the southern Caucasus, and violence against Chechens and others of Caucasian origin in Moscow is clear.[49] What is not as clear is whether anti-Chechen feeling on the part of some Muscovites and law enforcement officers working in Moscow has been generalized to include all people of dark complexion: that is, whether there is a causal relationship, however attenuated, between war in Chechnya and violence against African students.

Recent changes in the behavior and protocol of Russian law enforcement officers may provide an answer to this question. Following the attacks on the United States in 2001, African students in Moscow observed a shift in their relationship to the police. In their words, Africans were no longer "an object of suspicion [*objeto de desconfiança*]" as Arabs are.[50] Some students described an explicit change in the attitudes of law enforcement towards them: "After September 11th, the phenomenon of terrorism has been growing. Law enforcement is under constant pressure (*napriazhenie*). That's the basic problem for the special forces, but we're Africans – the police pass on by."[51] An African student and singer made popular in Russia with his 2003 hit *Shokoladnyi Zaiets* (Chocolate Rabbit) offered similar commentary: "The situation has changed. Seven years ago [when I came to Russia], if you were black, you got beat up, the police stopped you, asked for your papers, put their hands all over you.... Now, no. Now it's the guy with the black hair [who looks like he could be from the North Caucasus] who gets stopped, and the black guy just walks on without a problem."[52]

Amidst the combination of the United States' global campaign against terrorism and increased terrorist attacks within the Russian Federation, it seemed possible that African students could be caught up in a general dragnet targeting non-Slavs. The identification of terrorism with Muslim identity in the Russian popular imagination, together with the fact that many African students hail from countries with significant Muslim populations , might seem to support this hypothesis.[53] However, the increase in surveillance activity and harassment on the part of law enforcement appeared not to be generalized to include Africans. In other words, while Caucasians and Africans belong to a single discursive category in the Russian vernacular, *chernyi* (black), the sources of state-sponsored violence in the lives of African and Caucasian students appear to be distinct. We thus cannot explain instances of violence against African students as a response to specific political events in Chechnya or in response to terrorism as such.

Electoral politics are another oft-cited reason for spikes in ethnic and other violence. The observation that incidences of violence strongly correlate with electoral calendars is hardly unique to Russia. In 2004, much of the reporting on anti-foreign attacks was published during the first quarter, between the Russian parliamentary and presidential elections. As noted above, however, the precise extent of anti-foreign violence is not known, nor is the precise variation over time in the frequency with which these attacks occur. It is possible that the extensive reporting on the subject – much of which appeared in foreign news sources, which are likely to carry relatively more coverage of Russia during the run-up to elections than at other times – reflected less a change in the frequency of attacks than a temporary increase in journalists' interest in those attacks. For this reason, we cannot conclude – though we likewise cannot eliminate the possibility – that violence against Africans is a punctuated trend tied to voting.

A second hypothesis emerges out of scholarship on Soviet cultural history. Here, violence against Africans in post-Soviet Russia could be regarded as a logical outgrowth of or continuity with the submerged racism of Soviet popular culture and, to a lesser extent, political discourse. That such racism was present is apparent in analyses of Soviet popular culture and textbooks,[54] but it does not figure in narratives of students, who emphasize the superiority of Soviet-era political culture in this regard. African students who studied in the Soviet Union prior to *perestroika* describe encounters with affective racism and curiosity about their skin color, but they emphasize that violence was not part of their daily lives.[55]

Some students framed their experiences of fear and intimidation as a consequence of the end of Soviet power. Nonetheless, Soviet-era ideology and social control remained central to students' explanations for current violence against foreigners. They articulated this explanation in several ways: first, that the widespread fear of state power accompanying Soviet rule had dissipated together with the decline in the capacity of state institutions. Until the end of Soviet rule, people's fear of state power – particularly in the areas of surveillance and law enforcement – had resulted in compliance with official discourses of brotherhood and friendship among socialist countries.[56]

While acknowledging that acceptance of racist ideologies depends largely on individual cognitive choices, several students identified what they saw as two distinct groups of Russians: those raised in the Soviet Union; and "the new person," whom students described as dangerous.[57] Those students described how people who had grown up under Soviet rule had shielded them from official harassment. In the early 1990s, for instance, police officers stopped and harassed one of our interlocutors near a Moscow metro station.[58] An elderly Russian woman approached, excoriated the police officer for bothering the African student, and, in fashion not atypical for the time, hit one of the officers with her handbag. It is important to note that this type of "policing from below" depended on not only the elderly woman's socialization to Soviet norms, but the officer's as well.[59]

Students hypothesized that the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the weakened capacity of its largest successor state left individuals who might have been inclined toward such violence during the Soviet era unfettered by concerns about consequences for their actions in the post-Soviet era. This violence occurs in a context in which state actors frequently appear unresponsive to the problem: African students believe that if they turn to law enforcement for assistance in the event of an attack, they will be met with indifference at best.[60] Incomplete consolidation of democracy had led some individuals to think, in the words of one African student, that "democracy means you can do whatever you want."[61] For those individuals, democracy meant freedom from social control but not from civic responsibility.[62]

This argument provides some purchase on violence practiced against Africans, but it alone does not explain why Africans in particular have become a target of both state-sponsored and societal violence.[63] The temporary weakening of the norm-generating capacity of state institutions in the 1990s did allow individuals inclined toward violent expressions of racism greater freedom to follow a range of ideological inclinations. However, the capacity of law enforcement institutions – and the apprehension they inspire in the population – has not weakened in recent years. To the contrary; since the ascension of Vladimir Putin to power in 2000, state security services have reasserted and consolidated their strength. A complete explanation for violence against Africans would account not only for ideological shifts – which may explain societal tolerance of such violence – but also for the gap between state capacity that is adequate for resolving the problem and the continued existence of violence.

A third explanation for violence is rooted in anti-immigrant postures amidst economic crisis or recession. This explanation is borne out in part with the rise of nativist sentiments among some portions of the Russian population. However, at least two conditions suggest that economic factors may not be the primary consideration driving anti-African violence. First, African students do not enjoy obvious economic privilege within Russian society.[64] Many students live with severe economic difficulties but have little recourse for improving their situation. All students we interviewed described the difficulty of obtaining work and were careful to point out that even part-time jobs were characterized by poor working conditions and nonexistent contracts. A number of students noted that their studies leave them little time to work.[65] In the rare cases when they were able to find work, they sometimes did not receive payment.[66] In other words, African students face workplace conditions similar to those encountered by many Russians. Because those students are rarely visible in employment situations (many described restaurant kitchen work as common), they are unlikely to be perceived, as in the traditional refrain, to be "taking jobs away" from citizens.[67]

Second, economic crisis does not explain attacks carried out by representatives of the state. The degree and frequency of the harassment to which African students are exposed may be rooted in the fact that state employees receive relatively low salaries: dark-skinned foreigners report being "fined" with great regularity by police officers.[68] One student described a recent incident: "Two days ago the police bothered me – they conducted a criminal investigation. They stopped me, searched me, looked through my wallet, and then asked me to buy them beer [*pivom ugoshchaite?*]."[69] While economic crisis – combined with budgetary decisions made at the federal and municipal levels – may contribute to widespread graft, it does not explain why police officers sometimes beat foreigners, or why some may stand by and watch as others carry out acts of violence.

## EXPLAINING ANTI-AFRICAN VIOLENCE

In all likelihood, violence against Africans and other foreigners has multiple causes. In this section we present an additional hypothesis that we believe may better explain the violence experienced by African students at RUDN. This explanation accounts for students' narratives of menace and violence; it also provides a way of thinking about violence that acknowledges similarities in experience among people of African, Asian, and Caucasian origin within an analytical framework that considers the distinctiveness of Africans' experience. That is, this explanation distinguishes between "blackness" as a social trope under which multiple ethnicities and "races" are grouped and blackness as a specifically African identity.

Within the contemporary Russian vernacular "blackness" is not only a skin tone designation but also a quasi-geographical referent for individuals from or associated with the global south. Depending on context, not only Africans but also Caucasians, South and Central Asians, Roma, people of Middle Eastern origin, and other groups may be considered "black" – and subject to epithets and related social censure accordingly.[70] The vocabulary of racial discourse is thus generalized; while there exist specific stereotypes and derogatory terms for a variety of nationalities, the designation "black people" includes a broad swath of ethnicities with dramatically different historical experiences within Russia.

Africans' historical presence in Russia, however, is distinctive – particularly relative to that of other groups included under the discursive umbrella of "blackness."[71] Despite a long history of political and trade contact between African countries and Russia, African students do not share with their Caucasian and central Asian classmates a legal-territorial relationship with Russia or with other areas of former Soviet space. The dissolution of the Soviet Union and the civil conflicts that ensued along the borders of new states led to substantial immigration from former Soviet republics into the Russian Federation during the 1990s. Many students from the Caucasus and Central Asia are part of a semi-permanent diaspora within Moscow with an ethnic "homeland" (however contested) elsewhere.[72]

The central distinction between African students' experience and that of many other "black" individuals is thus between temporary migration and more permanent diaspora. African students minimize their own victimization when asked about the experiences of students from the Caucasus and Central Asia, couching their own explanations of the difference in the likelihood that students from the Caucasus "will [remain] here.... We'll go home after five years."[73] Ethnic Russians who participate in attacks, so the thought goes, experience relatively greater anxiety about the presence of ethnic minorities they believe to be emigrants, not visitors. Thus, while violence against people of Caucasian and other ex-Soviet origin is phenotypically similar to violence against Africans, it may have a different social etiology. In other words, what appears to be a general trend of violence against foreigners in contemporary Russia may in fact be several phenomena, each with a distinct origin.

An explanation for anti-African violence may be found in the institutional past of the Russian Federation, that is, among the legacies of Soviet nationality policies that gave institutional and territorial form to nationhood for some ethnic minorities within Soviet space.[74] This practice, which assigned geographic homelands to Bashkirs, Tatars, and a number of other groups, consigned ethnic groups without territorial identity to invisibility, save for entries in the infamous "line five" (reserved to indicate a person's ethnic identity) of their passports. It is our argument that the way in which Soviet official culture constructed and reproduced ethnicity, together with the particular character of state efforts to foster collectivity at a micro-social level, left a complicated trail of social exclusion for Africans in Moscow.

Active efforts on the part of the post-war Soviet state to generate and sustain collective forms of social organization led to the development of a societal matrix of mutual surveillance from which little egress was possible.[75] The stronger and more widespread the articulation of dichotomized us-them identities, the more dislocated and alien the individual who fit nowhere within accepted, institutionalized forms of collective social identities.[76] This state of affairs was particularly problematic for Africans, who did not easily fit an "other" identity within Soviet society. Strong ties between African countries and the Soviet state, together with an ideology of socialist brotherhood, made Africans truly neither *svoi* (us) nor *chuzhoi* (them). Africans, like some other putative "younger siblings" of socialist brotherhood, were neither Western nor Eastern nor exactly Russian.

Africans' status as people outside of many of the *kollektivy* (collectives) – both conceptual and real – organizing Soviet life made them ultimate outsiders. Their uneasy position within the dominant *svoi-chuzhoi* paradigm now leaves them more vulnerable as possible objects of attack. Skinheads who commit violence against Africans are explicit in their xenophobic ideology; it is societal tolerance of those attacks, and official perpetration of violence, that remains to be explained. At a macro-social level, what motivates official attacks against Africans may be not only a reflection of racial anxiety, but also an indication of a complex societal dynamic that punishes outliers to collectivity in the midst of multiple "acceptable" *kollektivy*. The arguably persistent centrality of collective identity within Russian society, and the particular fostering of collective social identities under Soviet rule, meant that exclusion from them was quite literally dehumanizing. Such dehumanization, as is well known, is the *sine qua non* of hate crimes and ethnically based attacks.

## VIOLENCE AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF PAN-AFRICAN COMMUNITY

African students' encounters with racism, discrimination, and violence in Moscow have brought a number of immediately negative consequences, which include physical injury, financial loss, barriers to academic success, intimidation, and social isolation. That only a few of the students with whom we spoke stated any desire to leave Russia demonstrates the depth of their commitment to the individual and collective social benefits that they associate with higher education.[77] Students demonstrated clear concern for their personal safety and their ability to complete their studies. Equally clear in their experiences, though not as explicitly articulated, were the ways in which social exclusion and persecution contribute to the ongoing formation of a pan-African identity. That identity has emerged from students' responses to the generally hostile environment in which they live. Their responses include the formation of protective linguistic and cultural communities organized around a pan-African identity. The existence of pan-African community in Moscow long precedes the violence of the post-Soviet period, but that violence has reshaped it.

Students' descriptions of the ways in which pan-African and even broader communities formed in response to anti-black violence point to origins that predate the fall of the Soviet Union. In the words of a Mozambican who spent seven years in the Soviet Union in the 1980s and early 1990s, "If there was trouble with a Mozambican, it didn't matter if it were a Mozambican, Guinean, or otherwise – everyone, African or not, came to the defense of an African or foreigner under attack. There was great unity in this sense."[78] In students' accounts, the overlapping of "black" identity with a specifically African identity helped establish ties among students of different African nationalities and even those of different continental origins. It should be noted that in previous decades, political winds shaped the contours of African communities in Moscow in ways that did not always encourage pan-African identity. In the late 1960s, tensions between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China guided the formation of African student cliques; some African students in Moscow formed cross-national social relationships based on whether their home country was allied with China or not.[79]

As much as students develop a sense of pan-African unity from the lived experience of racially motivated assaults, their perception of vulnerability further fosters that identity. Because of their acute awareness of that vulnerability, they are unlikely to venture out into public spaces on their own.[80] Relatively greater safety (though not invulnerability) in numbers leads students to seek traveling or shopping companions when moving through Moscow. In some cases companions are sought within a student's community of national origin, but the main organizing principle appears to be an African identity defined by others. In other words, the line that bounds African students' own conceptualization of *svoi* is drawn by their encounters with anti-African sentiment. As one student put it, "Our skin identifies us as foreign. And then one is the enemy."[81] Common experiences of social exclusion, combined with the residential concentration of African students at RUDN, drive them to develop pan-African social networks as a form of defensive organization. Their sense of vulnerability is truly transnational; reflecting on their perilous situation in Moscow, one group of students described following closely the case of Amadou Diallo, the twenty-two-year-old Guinean immigrant shot to death by New York City police officers in 1999.[82]

Student perception of vulnerability helps to form linguistic communities between students of diverse national origin. Russian language skills are one of the most important resources that students have at their disposal when confronting police harassment.[83] The ability to converse in Russian is no magic bullet, but an inability to do so almost guarantees an unsatisfactory outcome of such encounters. Thus, when students seek safety in numbers among their fellow students, they are as likely (or more so) to join with another African who has good Russian skills as they are to look specifically for someone from their country of origin.[84] Within the African student population, the official languages of their home countries sometimes bring students together in formations that tie together students of far-flung national territories if not necessarily the entire continent.[85] Moreover, in the multi-national environment of RUDN dormitories, Russian frequently serves as a lingua franca, helping to establish broader communities to which any student can subscribe.

African students experience a sense of social isolation that has both intellectual and territorial dimensions. In their eyes, the immediacy with which they are identified as non-Muscovites – and therefore out of place – contributes to the difficulties they confront. The extent to which Africans perceive that Russians "don't want to see foreigners, especially blacks"[86] contributes a spatial dimension to their isolation. The feeling of displacement, powerfully reinforced by the assaults they risk when in public places, works to restrict their movement. Many students rarely venture out into the city, staying within the student community at RUDN.[87] Their social life is largely confined to the university campus, which offers a protective environment. One outcome, then, of their spatial isolation (or displacement) is a stronger rootedness at RUDN itself and possibly a reinforced sense of community.

Students have also created a pan-African identity that appears to be largely a response to the negative image of Africa that dominates Russian popular culture. This pan-African identity operates in largely social or cultural settings, such as sport and athletic competitions organized on national lines. An African students' organization at RUDN holds an annual African festival, a week-long series of sporting competitions, music and dance performances, and offerings of national cuisine. The event is intended to promote African culture, as the students consider it their responsibility to "call attention to things African."[88] This is partly a generic diaspora response to territorial dislocation, but is also a clear effort to construct a broader community and to reject the negative labels that attach to African-identified representations in popular culture. The importance of the broader community is especially important for members of smaller national communities who lack the critical mass to form a cohesive social unit solely among their fellow nationals.[89] In this setting, African students can "feel happy to be called an African,"[90] while in the broader cultural environment, the best Africans currently can hope for is to be called a "chocolate boy" rather than a more familiar racial slur.[91]

## CONCLUSION

Recent years have seen changes in the ways in which Africans move through public spaces in Moscow and in their interactions with the other people who occupy those spaces. Students at RUDN noted one of the more striking changes: The global response to terrorism since 2001 has affected African student experiences in Moscow and changed how they perceive their social position. As they see it, people of actual or apparent Caucasian origin are now more distrusted and more subject to police harassment than Africans.[92] The most immediate consequence of the shift was a reduction of harassment and abuse of Africans at the hands of law enforcement.

The shift in whom law enforcement regards as a "suspicious object" reflects more than just a change in the policing of public spaces.[93] It is also evidence of a discursive shift regarding the place of darker-complected people in Moscow. Whereas before the category of "black" was largely superimposed over "African" to include other groups, the category "African" now has more noticeably emerged as a separate discursive category distinct from other categories of "blackness." The partial disaggregation of "blackness" from its component parts has allowed a specifically African identity to emerge more strongly. African students have noted this growing distinction in the extent to which they move freely throughout the city; while they are less frequently harassed by law enforcement, they remain, as Africans, the favored targets of attacks by skinheads and other groups.[94]

This vulnerability notwithstanding, the shift may well produce a protective discursive space for Africans in Moscow. If, as we have suggested, anti-African violence stems in part from the absence of a place for African identity within the social geography of Russian collective identities, then the emergence of a transnational, collective African identity may work to protect African students. The existence of an African collective identity, distinct from the broader category of "blackness," not only distinguishes Africans discursively from other citizens of the global South and East, but also may provide them a more intelligible place within *svoi-chuzhoi* (us-them) dichotomies of collective identities. That place will still mark them as outsiders, to be sure, but that outsider identity will be one included within the collective human community. As with other diaspora and migrant identities, African identity in Moscow ultimately will overcome displacement through rootedness – in this case a specifically Russian form of roots.

### Notes

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1. See, for example, Andrew F. Jones, *Yellow Music: Media Culture and Colonial Modernity in the Chinese Jazz Age* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2001); Andrew F. Jones and Nikhil Pal Singh, eds., "The Afro-Asian Century," *Positions*, vol. 11, no. 1 (2003), pp. 1-9. Amitav Ghosh interweaves history, anthropology, and literature to explore these themes in the context of Indian Ocean civilization in *In an Antique Land: History in the Guise of a Traveler's Tale* (New York: Vintage, 1994). Peter Rutland articulates a similar, if not identical idea in his review of *Beyond Area Studies Wars: Toward a New International Studies*. See Peter Rutland, "Remapping the World after the Crisis in Area Studies," *Diaspora*, vol. 10, no. 1 (2001), pp. 129-136. Historical perspectives that propose analogous remappings of political and economic systems include Andre Gunder Frank, *ReOrient: Global Economy in the Asian Age* (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1998) and Janet L. Abu-Lughod, *Before European Hegemony: The World System A.D. 1250-1350* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989).
2. Françoise Vergès uses the term "globalization from below" in "One World, Many Maps," in "The Promise of Freedom and its Practice: Global Perspectives on South Africa's Decade of Democracy," *The Wiser* (Wits Institute for Social and Economic Research) *Review*, University of Witwatersrand, no. 1 (July 2004), p. 16.
3. Much existing literature examines African experiences in the Soviet Union, including their encounters with racism. See, for example, Allison Blakely, *Russia and the Negro: Blacks in Russian History and Thought* (Washington, DC: Howard University Press, 1986); Woodford McClellan, "Africans and Black Americans in the Comintern Schools, 1925-1934," *International Journal of African Historical Studies*, vol. 26, no. 2 (1993), pp. 371-390; Lisa E. Davenport, "Jazz and the Cold War: Black Culture as an Instrument of American Foreign Policy," in Darlene Clark Hine and Jacqueline McCleod, eds., *Crossing Boundaries: Comparative History of Black People in Diaspora* (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1999), especially pp. 295-303; Charles Quist-Adade, *In the Shadows of the Kremlin and the White House: Africa's Media Image from Communism to Post-Communism* (Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 2001), pp. 33-42.
4. During the Soviet era, the Soviet government funded African education and training. Presently, financial support comes from a range of sources, including the Russian state, African governments, and private resources.
5. Interview, RUDN, December 2003. Some students who did communicate their encounters with racist hostility found their concerns rejected by earlier generations of students who, having had more positive experiences during the Soviet period, simply did not believe their younger compatriots. Sophie Lambroschini, "Russia: For African Students, Affordable Education Still Comes at a Price," Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 2 January 2004, http://www.rferl.org/features/features_Article.aspx?m=01&y=2004&id=FE445544-755E-42F7-B8D4-3CE52FF4BD4E (28 July 2004).

6. Interview, RUDN, December 2003.
7. Other non-Slavic foreign populations also have been the target of violent attacks. See, for example, Yelena Rotkevich, "Peterburg na grani pogromov" [Petersburg on the Brink of Pogroms], *Izvestia* (10 February 2004); Kim Murphy "A Tide of Hatred Swells in Russia," *Los Angeles Times* (19 February 2004) and Clem Cecil, "Skinheads Blamed for Race Crimes in Russia," *London Times* (14 February 2004), in Johnson's Russia List no. 8072; and Sonia Oxley, "Russia's Nationalistic Election Slogans Fuel Racism," Reuters, 4 March 2004, in Johnson's Russia List no. 8101.
8. Interview, RUDN, December 2003.
9. Interviews, RUDN, December 2003. One official account may be found in Maria Preobrazhenskaia, "Novyi pozhar v starom RUDN" [New Fire at the Old RUDN], http://www.politkom.ru (24 November 2003).
10. Interview, RUDN, December 2003. Whether the fire was due to arson or not, the fact students living in nearby dormitories believed that it had been is suggestive of the prevalence of violence in their lives. Sergei Belikov reports that skinheads in the area had made threats of arson and other attacks against the university a few years before. *Britogolovye: Vse o skinkhedakh. Ekskliuzivnye materialy* [Everything about Skinheads: Exclusive Materials] (Moscow: RGGU, 2002), pp. 109-110.
11. See, for example, Olga Vendina, "Social Polarization and Ethnic Segregation in Moscow," *Eurasian Geography and Economics*, vol. 43, no. 3 (2002), pp. 216-243. This phenomenon is explored in the context of nativist sentiment with respect to Chinese in Russia's Far East in Vilia Gelbras, "Natsional'naia bezopasnost' Rossii: vyzov kitaskoi migratsii" [National Security of Russia: the Challenge of Chinese Migration], in Galina Vitkovskaia and Sergei Panarin, *Migratsiia i bezopasnost' v Rossii* [Migration and Security in Russia] (Moscow: Interdialekt, 2000), pp. 188-226.
12. One example of this approach may be found in a recent appeal to the Russian government after the brutal murder of Nikolai Girenko, a leading scholar of ethnic minorities in St. Petersburg. "Grazhdane 23 stran mira obratilis' k Vladimiru Putinu v sviazi s gibel'iu Nikolaia Girenko" [Citizens of Twenty-three Nations Appeal to Vladimir Putin over the Death of Nikolai Girenko], http://newspb.ru (1 July 2004).
13. Daniel Goldhagen's *Hitler's Willing Executioners* (New York: Knopf, 1996), which chronicles the role of German anti-Semitism in carrying out the most extensive hate crime of the twentieth century, is the most widely known example of this genre.
14. We conducted in-depth, open-ended interviews with a total of eighteen students in December 2003. African students find themselves in an extraordinarily vulnerable position studying in Moscow. For that reason, we have included no information here as to the individual identities of the students we interviewed. Because more specific detail about the times and places of our interviews could allow some students to be identified, we have deliberately omitted that information. The interviews consisted of individual and group conversations that lasted several hours. Those interviews represented a broad spectrum of political, social, and economic experience – students hailed from multiple states, with various ethnic, linguistic, and class backgrounds – but they are not a random sample. Our findings here are preliminary; we expect that they may be shifted as well as sharpened by future research.

15. We should note that our experiences with and observations of contemporary Russia-Africa connections have a somewhat longer history, as our social networks spanning over a decade have included Africans of various nationalities in Russia, and Russians and Ukrainians in Mozambique and South Africa.
16. This stands in contrast to the diglossia present in some former Soviet states, in which each person speaks in the language most comfortable for him or her; this results in conversations in which, for example, one person speaks Ukrainian and the other Russian.
17. See, for example, Human Rights Watch, "Crime or Simply Punishment? Racist Attacks by Moscow Law Enforcement" (New York, 1995).
18. For a general discussion of anti-African violence in the Soviet Union, see Quist-Adade, *In the Shadow of the Kremlin*, pp. 77-83.
19. Interviews, RUDN, December 2003. Some former students reported that this phenomenon was present during the Soviet period, though to a far lesser extent. Students describe tiring of this variety of racism and meeting absurdity with absurdity – for example, answering in the affirmative to questions such as "Do you ride on elephants [rather than in cars] in Africa?" Interview, Associação de Amizade e Solaridade Entre os Povos [AMASP], Maputo, 30 June 2004.
20. Interview, RUDN, 30 December 2003. Several students also noted their great surprise at the lack of [non-orthodox] churches – a fact that contributed to their social marginalization.
21. Interview, AMASP, Maputo, 30 June 2004; Interview, RUDN, December 2003. Charles Quist-Adade reports a similar situation during the *glasnost* years. See Quist-Adade, *In the Shadows of the Kremlin*, pp. 57-58.
22. We encountered evidence of that distance on our first visit to RUDN, even before we knew enough to recognize it as such. Upon exiting the Yugo-Zapadnaia metro station, we approached a number of African and Asian students to ask for directions to the university. Not one replied or was even willing to look us in the eye.
23. Strongly derogatory epithets regularly appear in cinema. A scene in the popular film *Brat*, in which the main character calls a Caucasian man on a bus a "black ass," is but one example.
24. Chaif, *Shekogali*, 1999. The video for *Argentina-Jamaica 5-0* reached number seventy-six on MTV Russia's top 100 video list that year.
25. Zapreshchennye Barabanshchiki, *Ubili Negra*, 1999. The video for this song reached number thirty-six on MTV Russia's top 100 video list that year, after initially being held from broadcast.
26. Interview, RUDN, December 2003. For other examples of how such racism pervades popular culture, see Quist-Adade, *In the Shadows of the Kremlin*, pp. 50-68.
27. Interviews, RUDN, December 2003. Others described Caucasians as sticking to groups "for safety."
28. Seth Mydans, "African Students' Harsh Lesson: Violence is Astir in Russia," *Moscow Journal* (18 December 2003).
29. Mydans, "African Students' Harsh Lesson."
30. The authors observed this while conducting interviews at the university in December 2003.
31. See Human Rights Watch, "Crime or Simply Punishment?" for a comprehensive discussion of this type of harassment.

32. The authors have extensive experience of this type with the Moscow police, who have consistently shown little interest in the identity of the lighter-skinned member of the pair while frequently stopping the other for document inspections.
33. See Maria Selezneva and Yelena Zhuravleva, "Kolybel' russkogo natsizma" [The Cradle of Russian Nationalism], in *Novye Izvestia* (25 June 2004). See also "Another African Student Killed in Voronezh. Skinheads Suspected," RFE/RL, *Newsline*, 25 February 2004, http://www.rferl.org/newsline/2004/02/1-rus/rus-250204.asp (28 July 2004).
34. RFE/RL, *Infocus*, "Dormitory Fire Exposes Shoddy Building, Racism," 3 December 2003, http://www.rferl.org/reports/ucs/2003/12/35-031203.asp (28 July 2004).
35. Interview, RUDN, December 2003.
36. Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov blamed two female Nigerian students for using too many electrical appliances at once. Interview, RUDN, 30 December 2003 and 31 December 2003; "African Students' Harsh Lesson," *Moscow Journal* (18 December 2003); Sophie Lambroschini, "Russia: For African Students"; Amnesty International, "Russian Federation: Foreign Students at People's Friendship University Victims of Discrimination," 22 December 2003, http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGEUR460962003?open&of=ENG-RUS (28 July 2004).
37. Interview, RUDN, December 2003.
38. Interview, RUDN, December 2003; Lambroschini, "Russia: For African Students"; Amnesty International, "Russian Federation: Foreign Students."
39. Interview, RUDN, December 2003; Mydans, "African Students' Harsh Lesson."
40. Human Rights Watch, "Crime or Simply Punishment?" See also Quist-Adade, *In the Shadow of the Kremlin*, p. 77.
41. RFE/RL, *Newsline*, "Voronezh Prosecutors to Reinvestigate Cases of Crimes Against Foreigners," 9 April 2004, http://www.rferl.org/newsline/2004/04/090404.asp (28 July 2004).
42. Interview, RUDN, December 2003.
43. RFE/RL, "Dormitory Fire."
44. Interview, RUDN, December 2003.
45. The past years have seen apparent links between state institutions and skinheads in other parts of former Soviet spaces: events in Mukachevo, Ukraine, in 2004 may be a case in point.
46. Interview, RUDN, December 2003.
47. Interview, AMASP, 30 June 2004.
48. Interviews, RUDN, December 2003.
49. In this chapter, we use the word "Caucasian" in its literal sense: a person or persons with ethnic origins in the Caucasus region, not a "white" person or a person of European origin.
50. Interview, RUDN, December 2003.
51. Interview, RUDN, December 2003.
52. Sophie Lambroschini, "Russia: African Pop Star Tries to Show Russians Sweeter Side of Racial Diversity," RFE/RL, 2 January 2004, http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2004/01/9343b35a-a42f-4f18-9428-43354eec0ed4.html (28 July 2004).

53. The phenomenon of generalized xenophobia could be observed in the United States following the September 2001 attacks. Hate crimes were directed against South Asians and Latinos as well as Muslims of Arab origin. The widespread use of patriotic iconography as an apparent means of protection – a large sign in the glass storefront of a Thai-Chinese restaurant in Amarillo, Texas in 2002 proclaiming "We are proud to be and serve Americans" is but one example.
54. See, for example, Evgenii Steiner, *Stories for Little Comrades: Revolutionary Artists and the Making of Early Soviet Children's Books*, trans. Jane Ann Miller (Seattle, Wash.: University of Washington Press, 1999).
55. Interview, L. Siqueira, 30 June 2004; Interview, AMASP, 30 June 2004.
56. Interview, AMASP, 30 June 2004.
57. Interviews, RUDN, December 2003.
58. Interview, RUDN, December 2003. The metro station was Teplyi Stan.
59. It also should be noted that such a scene is imaginable only before the mid-1990s. As the decade progressed, young men replaced older women as the arbiters of (what became a quite different) social order.
60. All students we interviewed recounted at least one such instance. Also see, for example, "Britogolovye idut" [The Skinheads Are Coming], *Russkii kur'er* (18 June 2004), pp. 1, 12-13.
61. Interview, RUDN, December 2003.
62. It should be noted that if this assessment is correct, it does not apply to the majority of Russian citizens. In the results of an October 2000 poll, only 30 percent of those surveyed most strongly associated "democratic society" with civil liberties. Another 45 percent subscribed to social or economic definitions of democracy. L. A. Sedov, "Obshchestvennoe mnenie v oktiabre 2000 goda – press release" [Public Opinion in October 2000: A Press Release], http://www.levada.ru (November 2000).
63. A related explanation to that might be the entrance of western culture, which itself has long and well-documented history of violence against people of African origin. However, we believe the saturation of Russian popular culture with American commercial cinema, television, and music during the 1990s does not on its own prove the wholesale acceptance of western values – including racism as an ideology – on the part of the population. That skinhead and other youth subcultures exhibit transnational learning of ideology, however, is beyond dispute.
64. Of course, targeted groups frequently occupy a lower economic stratum than those who commit crimes against them. African students' access to higher education does place them in a category more privileged than some Russian citizens. Surveys conducted in Moscow in 1997-1998 showed that "just over 40 percent of respondents were unsure if their children would be able to receive a good education and a desirable profession." G.T. Zhuravleva et al., "Kul'tura, nauka, obrazovaniie v Moskve. Statistika i sotsiologiia" [Culture, Science, and Education in Moscow: Statistics and Sociology], *Simptom*, no. 63, p. 36, cited in V.G. Gluzhkova, *Sotsial'nyi portret Moskvy na poroge XXI veka* [Social Portrait of Moscow on the Threshold of the 21st Century] (Moscow: Mysl', 1999), p. 106.
65. Interview, RUDN December 2003.
66. Interviews, RUDN, December 2003.

67. Recent research on attitudes toward restricting immigration in the U.S. has shown that personal circumstances play a limited role in the formation of individuals' ideas about immigration; rather, beliefs about the national economy and ethnic groups shape attitudes. Jack Citrin, Donald P. Green, Christopher Muste, and Cara Wong, "Public Opinion Toward Immigration Reform: The Role of Economic Motivations," *The Journal of Politics*, vol. 59, no. 3 (August 1997), pp. 858-881.
68. Human Rights Watch, "Crime or Simply Punishment?"
69. Interview, RUDN December 2003.
70. One of the authors has encountered this designation with reference to Chinese in Ukraine. Interview, Zakarpats'ka *oblast'*, Ukraine, May 2004.
71. See K. Fikes and A. Lemon, "African Presence in Former Soviet Spaces," *Annual Review of Anthropology*, vol. 31, no. 1 (2002), pp. 497-524.
72. This difference is illustrated in one observer's comment on the role of women in Russian conceptualizations of "blackness": "Her mere presence (as a general symbol of tradition and continuity) communicates to Russians that her husband's residency is no longer temporary." Meredith L. Roman, "Making Caucasians Black: Moscow since the Fall of Communism and the Racialization of Non-Russians," *Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics*, vol. 18, no. 2 (2002), p. 10.
73. Interviews, RUDN, December 2003.
74. See, especially, Rogers Brubaker, "Nationhood and the National Question in the Soviet Union and post-Soviet Eurasia: An Institutionalist Account," *Theory and Society*, no. 23 (1994), pp. 47-78 and Terry Martin, *The Affirmative Action Empire: Nations and Nationalism in the Soviet Union, 1923-1939* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2001).
75. Oleg Kharkhordin, *The Collective and the Individual in Russia: A Study of Practices* (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1999).
76. This thesis, and its links to violence in post-Soviet Russia, is supported by the existence of an additional category of people sometimes targeted by skinheads: young people who ascribe to other "informal," culturally inscribed collective identities, such as heavy-metal fans.
77. Interview, RUDN, December 2003; see also Mydans, "African Students' Harsh Lesson," though even the student quoted there states only that he wants to leave after completing his studies. Nearly all of the students emphasized the importance of their education and training to economic growth and development in their home countries.
78. Interview, AMASP, 30 June 2004.
79. Interview, L. Siqueira, 30 June 2004.
80. Interview, RUDN, December 2003; Lambroschini, "Russia: For African Students."
81. Interview, RUDN, December 2003.
82. Interview, RUDN, December 2003.
83. Interview, RUDN, December 2003.
84. Interview, RUDN, December 2003.
85. For example, the Conferência das Colónias Africanas da Língua Portuguesa.
86. Interview, AMASP, 30 June 2004.
87. Interview, RUDN, December 2003.

88. Interview, RUDN, December 2003.
89. Interviews, RUDN, December 2003.
90. Interview, RUDN, December 2003.
91. Lambroschini, "Russia: African Pop Star."
92. Interviews, RUDN, December 2003. As discussed earlier, students explicitly linked this change to the terrorist attacks in the United States in September 2001 and what they saw as Russian fear of Caucasian-organized attacks in Moscow. It is especially interesting to note that the students attributed the change to the attacks in the United States and not the October 2002 seizure of a Moscow theater by Chechen fighters. A multi-day siege by Russian security forces ended with 117 hostages dead in an episode that traumatized the populace of Moscow. One might expect that the theater siege would have left a greater impression than the attacks in the United States, but Putin himself linked the attack on the theater to the wider "war on terror" which has the 2001 attacks as its iconic origin.
93. Interview, RUDN, December 2003.
94. Interview, RUDN, December 2003.