CHAPTER 2

Post-Soviet or Eurasian Lands? Rethinking Analytic Categories in the Ukraine–EU and Russia–China Borderlands

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INTRODUCTION

Is there something "post-Soviet" about Eurasian borders? Literature in the social sciences has long encouraged us to think about post-Soviet spaces as sharing certain family resemblances. More recently, influential work in political theory views contemporary borders across the globe as expressing a common experience of waning state sovereignty (Brown 2010). But do these taxonomical and theoretical constructs, and their underlying assumptions, reflect the work that borders in Eurasia actually do? A quarter century after the demise of the Soviet Union, this chapter investigates what it means to think about "post-Soviet" and "Eurasian" borders. It does so in the context of two fieldwork-based investigations along and across the demarcations separating Ukraine and European Union (EU) countries, and the Russian Federation and China.[1]

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The borderlands in question mark the outer limits of former Soviet territory near its western and easternmost reaches. To the west, one borderland extends north and southeast of the towns of Chop (in Ukraine) and Záhony (in Hungary), where the demarcation separates Ukraine from Slovakia to the west, and Hungary to the south. Nearly 10,000 kilometers to the east, the other borderland tracks the Amur-Heilongjiang River at and around the fluvial cities of Blagoveshchensk and Heihe.

As fragments of external borders of the same state, the demarcations within these borderlands were fortified in similar ways during the second half of the twentieth century. The expanses on the Soviet side of each border, today Ukrainian and Russian territory respectively, partake in a shared history of infrastructural development, internal migration, and wartime occupation. Today, these demarcations are materializations of discourses of transnational relations that alternately conceptualize borders as bulwarks against unwanted population flows and sites of transnational cooperation. In each case, the demarcated border separates countries whose labor endowments, costs of living, and extent of foreign ownership or control of land are asymmetric: goods and labor flow into the EU from Ukraine and from China into Russia, while European and Chinese capital supports agricultural production in Ukraine and Russia. In both instances, the demarcated border once separated Soviet space from communist states—albeit states with very different relationships with Moscow.

Both "post-Soviet" and "Eurasian" would seem to be appropriate ways to describe these borderlands. But these descriptors carry different kinds of analytical baggage, evoke distinct histories, and activate diverse geopolitical, cultural, and other registers. Used as conceptual lenses, how do the two filter our perception of reality on the ground differently? What does each descriptor tempt us to see? Amidst the broad use of both concepts in academic research, and in the face of repeated challenges to the sovereignty of Soviet successor states, this chapter asks what each concept can contribute to our understanding of borderlands in spaces formerly governed by the Soviet Union.

We emphasize that the "we" used here refers to a global academic community communicating in the English language. It expressly does not include our interlocutors in these borderlands: post-Soviet and Eurasia are experience-distant concepts, invented and employed mainly by politicians, academics, and journalists (Geertz 1974). Neither is widely used in everyday speech in these two borderlands—nor, for that matter, by ordinary people in many other places from the Danube to the Pacific.

When we use post-Soviet or Eurasian as the lens through which we regard a particular territory, we import an analytic framework from the world of theory to the world of experience.

Some might describe this chapter as a work of political ethnography: it examines aspects of the "lived experience of the political" (Baiocchi and Conner 2008, 140), and it draws upon research conducted in situ while seeking to understand borderlands from perspectives of our interlocutors (Schatz 2009). However, this text differs from other works of political ethnography—including much of our own previous research—in one important respect. In this text, we mean to make more transparent the relationship between the experience-distant concepts that organize thought and the details we happen to notice, and use, in producing ethnographic narrative. In order to think through and illustrate the ways that two concepts may shape our vision, we have produced descriptive narratives that are selective by design. Ordinarily, we might develop a single ethnographic narrative and from that narrative draw out theoretical implications or conclusions. Here, we deliberately select details from our research and assemble them into two narratives that each highlight different aspects of sovereignty and regularity in borderlands.

In the following pages, we first provide context for our analysis, describing briefly the natural and human landscapes of these two borderlands. We then examine the uses of post-Soviet as a category of analysis and analyze the two borderlands through a post-Soviet lens. Next, we consider Eurasia and the various ways scholars have equipped that term with meaning. Using a framework that synthesizes those various meanings, we re-examine the two borderlands in question through a Eurasian lens. Finally, we revisit our two cases—these borderlands as viewed through "post-Soviet" and these borderlands as viewed through "Eurasia"—to discover what "Eurasia" might help reveal that "post-Soviet" does not.

The Margins of Empire

The places at the center of this chapter lie at the outer limits of former Soviet space. In contrast to borderlands discussed elsewhere in this volume, in these places, the fall of Soviet power led neither to the appearance of new demarcations, nor to the redefinition of internal republican demarcations as external borders of independent states. In both cases, the demarcations have remained stable from the late Soviet period to the present day.

In the borderlands that lie at the intersection of Ukraine and two EU countries—Slovakia and Hungary—the demarcation runs through largely rural terrain, punctuated by settlements of a few hundred people and a smaller number of towns and cities. Below verdant mountains that rise to the north, the basin surrounding the border crossing at Záhony-Chop spreads wide, dry, and flat. Villages whose recorded history begins in the fourteenth century of the Common Era are separated by fields of corn, wheat, and rye, punctuated by the ruins of Soviet-era machine tractor stations and grain elevators. Further to the southeast lies the city of Beregszász, founded at the end of the eleventh century. Railroad tracks, laid and re-laid as empires and nation-states competed for control of the territory in the twentieth century, trace paths through the countryside. A few asphalt roads connect settlements whose unpaved byways are lined by cherry, walnut, and apple trees. Grape vines canopy the courtyards of village houses and stretch laterally toward homestead potato plots that extend behind settlements.

Along the demarcation there are several border crossings within a few dozen kilometers, two of which, as of this writing, are restricted to pedestrians. In the decade since Hungary and Slovakia became members of the EU, some crossings have been opened and subsequently closed, leading to localized pockets of economic instability as businesses develop and flourish, only to wither when the border is resealed.[2] The main border passage for people and goods is at Chop-Záhony, twin settlements that were the primary crossing point between the Soviet Union and Hungary. Chop is a railroad city of about 8000 people; to its west and north, the M25 highway passes at a right angle from the Hungarian interior to the Ukrainian city of Mukacheve. The river Tisza, marking the border between Hungary and Ukraine, cradles the city to the south. Záhony, about half the size of Chop in population, lies just beyond the Tisza. From it, a highway stretches southwest to the eastern Hungarian city of Nyíregyháza.

The expanses of the physical border, as they appear from settlements on the Ukrainian side of the demarcation, are made of barbed wire fence, beyond which a broad no-man's-land separates Ukrainian territory from the countries of the EU. Negotiations over border security between EU states and Ukraine have resulted in an asymmetrical investment of resources to reinforce the border, in which border-crossing infrastructure and troop presence are more visible on the Ukrainian side.

The demarcated border in this area is only seventy years old. Prior to the end of World War I, the area had been Hungarian territory. Following the 1920 Treaty of Trianon, it was governed by Czechoslovakia until Hungarian troops retook the area in 1938. Thus began its status as a borderland: for the next six years, the land and settlements around Chop bordered Carpathian Ukraine to the east and Slovakia to the north. After a brief period of German occupation, the arrival of Soviet troops was followed by the construction of a new border fence and infrastructure that stretched north and southeast of Chop, cutting through the fabric of settlements previously linked by commerce, kinship, and land (e.g. Zelei 2000).

In the corridor lining the Ukrainian side of the demarcation, people today speak Ukrainian or Hungarian, or both, at home, but many also speak Russian, Slovak, or Rusyn. A complex twentieth-century history of occupation by multiple powers, layered upon several hundred years of Hungarian rule, has yielded a variegated landscape of cultural practices and identifications of belonging. In comparison, the population along the border in Hungary is relatively linguistically homogenous. To the west and north in Slovakia, historically Magyar settlements line the demarcated border. However, in large part due to Slovakia's minorities policies, the residents of those settlements are assimilated and speak both Slovak and, at home, Hungarian. When they cross the border into Ukraine and visit sister villages there, they often speak Slovak in public.

Far across the continental landmass to the east, the cities of Blagoveshchensk and Heihe face one another across the banks of the Amur-Heilongjiang. The urban core of each city includes just over 200,000 people, with a more densely populated area surrounding Heihe. Blagoveshchensk, the urban descendent of a nineteenth-century Russian trading settlement (see Bassin 1999), serves as the administrative center for the Amur region. In the prefectural city of Heihe, contemporary heir to the seventeenth-century village of Aigun, state investment in infrastructural development has produced an economic boom.

The two cities form part of a double necklace of settlements that trace the river's edge, each facing the other across the watercourse where the Amur-Heilongjiang narrows to a breadth of three quarters of a kilometer. Unlike some settlements whose cross-river perspective is obstructed by fluvial islands (Iwashita 2004, 111), the cities lie close enough along a clear channel that residents of Blagoveshchensk strolling along the embankment can easily read large signage adorning riverfront buildings of Heihe.

Heihe today includes the site of the 1865 century Treaty of Aigun, which returned to Russia the vast swathe of territory between the Amur-Heilongjiang and the Stanovoi mountain range that had been ceded to

China in the 1689 Treaty of Nerchinsk.[3] After bitter negotiations at Aigun (Paine 1996, 68), the treaty resulted in the cession of territory north of the Amur-Heilongjiang to Russia and provided for continuing Manchu control of a cluster of rural settlements (the "Sixty-Four Villages East of the River") east of where the northern tributary Zeia flows into the Amur. This control held until the time of the Boxer Rebellion and the bombardment of Blagoveshchensk, following which thousands of Chinese were expelled from that city and the Sixty-Four Villages East of the River in a bloodbath of civilian life.

A century later, Heihe came to represent a gateway city to Russia and the outside world. An open customs port in the early 1960s and again starting in 1982, and with renewed intensity following Deng Xiaoping's southern tour in 1992, the city enacted the Chinese policy of openness as a site of cross-border trade and human mobility. To the west of Heihe, a transmission line traverses the river, connecting the power grids of the two countries and serving as a conduit for the electricity that Russia exports to China.

From Heihe, a five-fingered delta of roads reaches into the interior, joining thoroughfares that link the city with Harbin, the capital of Heilongjiang province, and other major cities in China's northwest. Along the eastern riverbank in the Russian Federation, cities are served by a single major east-west highway that, rather than fanning out from urban areas to hinterland, traces the border with China, linking the city of Belogorsk, 140 kilometers into the Russian interior from Blagoveshchensk, with Khabarovsk and the Pacific city of Vladivostok to the east and Chita, Ulan-Ude, and Irkutsk to the west. With road infrastructure development on the Chinese side and greater openness to cross-border trade and mobility, Blagoveshchensk is now better connected by ground transportation to cities in the Chinese interior than to other urban areas in Russia.

Blagoveshchensk, an economically poorer but educationally vibrant municipality, serves as a conduit for shuttle trading from Heihe and the export of Russian natural resources to northern Heilongjiang. During periods of friendly relationships between Moscow and Beijing, the city's inhabitants interacted with residents of Heihe in shared activities and trade. At other times, communication has been more limited, with restrictions on pedestrian movement along the embankment or travel to outlying villages from Blagoveshchensk (Iwashita 2004, 130). In the mid-1990s, with the imposition of restrictions on the movement of Chinese people into Russia, citizens of Blagoveshchensk took on a greater role in the cross-border shuttle trade. Meanwhile, some local politicians and elites in Moscow have attempted to stir anxieties about the possibility of a flood of Chinese migrants into the eastern Siberian hinterland (Lukin 2003, 164–193).

Beyond the twin cities and riparian zones, the terrain is less densely populated. From Heihe-Blagoveshchensk, nearly 1000 kilometers downstream from its headwaters in Mongolia, the Amur-Heilongjiang flows southeast. On the western (Chinese) side of the river, fields and forests stretch for scores of kilometers, punctuated by villages and settlements of the prefecture. The stretch of the river channel around the twin cities is populated in part by farmers who cultivate industrial crops—corn, wheat, and soy—on both sides of the waterway. Farms on the northern bank rely upon day and remittance laborers who regularly cross into Russia from the more densely populated Chinese side.

A part of the population of the area speaks a language proper to neither contiguous state: speakers of Tungusic languages, among them Manchu and Evenki, live along both sides of the border. Meanwhile, disputed fluvial islands now governed by China are home to people historically and popularly considered to be at once Russian and Chinese. The 20,000 or so people who fall into this category are not recognized as an official minority by either country. In Russia, they must indicate in their passports that they have "no nationality." In China, they are recognizable by virtue of being Russian speakers. Some of those who do not live "in between" stay in one of the two countries, while others migrate back and forth.[4]

Post-Soviet as a Category of Analysis

In the years immediately following the Soviet collapse, the concept "post-Soviet" gave researchers a language with which to refer, amidst great upheaval, to a particular time and expanse of territory. Over the past quarter century, scholars have continued to use post-Soviet as an organizing principle and temporal and spatial referent to analyze a broad range of political, social, and economic phenomena, including "legacies" of the Soviet past.

We take the concept post-Soviet to be fixed in space and elastic in time. Spatially, post-Soviet delimits territory governed by the Soviet Union until just prior to its collapse. It denotes a shared past and implies some degree of coherence or regularity across territory—even as it does not presume that conditions, or responses to conditions, were identical everywhere. If post-Soviet space is defined by the limits of particular political–economic arrangements and accompanying social relationships, this expanse can be imagined not as uniform, but as sharing certain characteristics.[5] From this point of view, the external borders of the Soviet Union served as containers for a certain kind of world.[6] This container was not meant to be watertight: even as Soviet borders enclosed territory, protecting it from worlds in which the driving logic was capital accumulation (Verdery 2002, 16), such borders were at times porous with respect to ideas and culture.

Related to the idea of the post-Soviet, in Humphrey's view (2002, 12), the "foundational unity" of lived socialism made post-socialism a useful concept—especially in the face of the multiplicity of economic forms that scholars continue to assign to a single conceptual category, "capitalism." The post-socialist encompassed a wide variety of phenomena and shared experience, leading to the use of the term to describe a wide variety of lived realities. The literature on nostalgia, for example, points to the coherence of some values across space: "post-Soviet" or even "post-socialist" is the spatial unit across which longing for socialist-era values is inscribed (Yurchak 2005, 8–9).

If the outer boundaries of post-Soviet space are understood as fixed, marking the limits of certain (though not all) institutions and infrastructure emanating from Moscow, the temporal boundaries of the post-Soviet are elastic and undefined. "Post-Soviet" generally refers to an unspecified period of time following the Soviet collapse. Even the beginning of this period lacks some clarity: some locate a significant shift in the meaning of Soviet values and forms of social and political organization well before the collapse of the Soviet Union (Paretskaya 2012), and the Soviet collapse itself was not experienced at the same time or in the same way across Soviet territory (Pisano 2015). There is even less agreement about when—or if—the post-Soviet ended. For some, it terminates with the recent re-emergence of Russian expansionism. For others, it is delimited by shifts in discursive practices. For example, Platt (2009) links the "end of the post-Soviet" in part to the re-emergence of the salience of pre-Soviet identities and historical narratives, while Oushakine's (2000) interrogation of post-Soviet subjectivity is anchored in the specific discursive practices (or silences) characteristic of this particular social condition.

For many, the "post-Soviet" has been a site for interrogating societal change. A broad body of work has focused on how practices associated with Soviet pasts encode new meanings, while other work has attempted to untangle ways in which post-Soviet realities may suggest genealogical relationships with the previous order (Jowitt 1992; Kotkin and Beissinger 2014; Wittenberg 2015) or improvisations—deliberate invocations that recycle elements of past discourses (Pisano 2014, 223).

What would it mean to see the external borderlands of former Soviet space as "post-Soviet"? Demarcated borders at the edge of the former Soviet Union no longer serve their former functions: they neither are unified by a single economic logic, nor delimit an expanse coordinated by single supra-republican set of institutions and ideology. Nor, in practice, do they today separate worlds characterized by dramatically different political–economic arrangements rooted in distinct ideologies. What functions do they serve, and how? In the following paragraphs, we briefly examine Ukraine–EU and Russia–China borderlands through a post-Soviet lens, considering temporal and spatial boundaries and the role of legacy. What is post-Soviet about these portions of a single historical border, and what might be some of the analytical implications of calling a border, or a borderland post-Soviet?

Post-Soviet Sociality

In the context of the two borderlands at the center of this chapter, what meanings does the concept post-Soviet invoke when it is applied to the outer demarcation of a former state? At first glance, the demarcations at the edge of former Soviet space would seem to behave as state borders do in many places in the world: they have changed function as the world around them has changed. In both the Ukraine–EU and the Russia–China borderlands, personnel and physical infrastructure regulate the movement of people and goods across the demarcation. In neither case is the demarcation meant—or reinforced—to serve as a bulwark against an invading state. These borders hold back threats that would seem to be not other states, but non-state actors (Brown 2010).

Remnants of the Soviet period in these two borderlands may be found in multiple sites, in physical, institutional, discursive, and normative forms. Most of what persists has been filtered through nearly a quarter century of dramatic economic and social change: along the western limits of post-Soviet space, cross-border relationships were transformed with the accession of Slovakia and Hungary to the EU and Slovakia's adoption of the Euro; the opening and closing of additional border crossings between Ukraine and these countries; and the explosion of petty commerce that followed the influx of Slovaks and Hungarian consumers into the Ukrainian borderlands (Pisano 2009); in the Russia–China borderlands, these relationships changed with state-driven urban development on the southern banks of the Amur-Heilongjiang, voracious demand for timber in Heilongjiang Province, the creation of a free-trade zone, and further liberalization of the border regime.[7]

A search for regularity across territory and a link with the Soviet past reveal a distinctive salient feature of both borderlands that is shared by the Ukrainian and Russian sides of the demarcation but is not present on either Chinese or EU member state territory. What remains of the Soviet Union, albeit in more decrepit form, is the infrastructure that governs the collective movement of persons in the borderlands of former Soviet territory. On the borderlands territory of EU countries and China, investment in urban development and infrastructural improvement has transformed the face of the demarcation. The same may be said for infrastructure catering to automobile traffic in Ukraine just inside the demarcation. However, border crossings in former Soviet territory that serve people who move by bus or train have largely maintained both their previous physical infrastructure and their modalities of information transmission.

On former Soviet territory, successful navigation of borderland space requires extensive knowledge—or rather, in most cases, the willingness and ability to ask others for this information in the requisite language or languages—of unwritten rules, timetables, and habits. For those traveling by train through the Soviet-era train station at Chop, the border passage is characterized by a series of steps that are segmented and visually isolated from one another. At no point in the passage is it possible to see the next step in the trip, nor to read about it. This feature of the voyage encourages, even requires, communication and exchange among passengers (see also Simonyi and Pisano 2011, 226). Communication transcends nationality or linguistic practice: uncertainty about which, and whose, rules govern different parts of the process leads to the frequent exchange of questions and requests in station halls and train wagons. Because rules seem to change with some frequency, exchange among people who make the passage regularly is ongoing. Among Ukrainian speakers, the absence of written communication of rules is understood locally as a product of a long tradition of verbal direction, as in the medieval pilgrims' aphorism still in use in both Ukraine and Russia today, albeit in slightly different contexts, that one's "tongue will lead [one] to Kyiv."

In Heihe-Blagoveshchensk, the Russian side of the passage is unaccompanied by written notice of rules. There, the lack of posted information likewise prompts informal communication and conversations among strangers. The rules for passage from Blagoveshchensk to Heihe are not made explicit in the terminal; informally, there are three different prices for passage, based on speed through Russian customs and comfort in waiting,[8] but this can only be known through communication with other passengers or customs officials. The same is true for numerous other types of information unavailable in written notices: locations of border crossings; times of passages and holiday closures; tariffs and unofficial “fees”; limits on transportation of goods; how physically to proceed from one hall or staircase in the two-story physical structure in which passports are processed before passengers may go out onto the ice or river bank; what tickets and chits must be purchased at which part in the process; and so on.

On the EU and Chinese sides of these boundaries, by contrast, rules in the demarcated border itself are legible, even to visitors. Information is available in written form and is clearly indicated and posted in visible areas in border crossings themselves. Russians thus can navigate the passage and much of Heihe without uttering a word of Chinese: ingoing and outgoing customs processes are organized as in an airport, with little need for verbal communication. Likewise, navigating the Hungarian side of the Ukraine–EU border is uncomplicated: information is posted, and lines of vision are unobstructed.

Post-Soviet borders, viewed through the EU–Ukraine and Sino-Russian territories considered here, no longer function as a container for the communist world, but rather seem to mark the boundaries of a particular relationship to text-based communication (see Scott et al. 2002), and a specific sociality that may be rooted in both Soviet and pre-Soviet practices of information transmission,[9] as well as in contemporary infrastructural decay and de-development (Pisano 2007; Litchfield 2014). In this sense, these demarcations continue to signal, in similar ways, the limits of a particular world where, in very specific ways (Ledeneva 2006, 2013), informal modalities of control work with and sometimes predominate over formal channels, written rules, and rule of law.

Eurasia as a Category of Analysis

If a “post-Soviet” approach to these borderlands reifies the Soviet Union as the relevant historical referent for these particular stretches of territory, encourages us to train our vision on the demarcation and its accompanying infrastructure, and highlights a sociality common to both borderlands within former Soviet territory, what might we see when we examine these borderlands with different eyes? What might we see if we instead look at these borderlands as Eurasian spaces? What sort of analytical framework would such an approach to the borderlands suggest?

The idea of Eurasia, which during the Soviet era had been broadly understood as coextensive with Soviet territory, later began to emerge as a distinct conceptual referent in diverse areas of discourse.[10] In recent years, scholarship increasingly has turned to the use of this concept to describe and analyze former Soviet territory.[11] While some deploy the term Eurasia simply to indicate the landmass that includes the European and Asian continents, the word carries a variety of other meanings and connotations. The concept is fluid, with scholars drawing its boundaries in different places according to a variety of parameters—whether geography, economy, political institutions, or culture. This is particularly the case in its western expanse, though the boundaries of Eurasia to the east, and its inclusion or exclusion from empires, are also contested and variously defined (Rieber 2014).

After the Soviet collapse, the International Eurasian Movement conflated Eurasian geographical space with Eurasianist geopolitical ambitions to support its discursive and narrative claims to territories well beyond the boundaries of the Russian Federation.[12] Thus, in the contemporary context, the use of the term is not always politically neutral. In certain contexts, it has been used as an ideological construct meant to replace "Soviet" (Laruelle 2015). This, together with the fact that, as Laruelle has noted, the Russian language makes no distinction between "Eurasianism" as an ideological construct and "Eurasian" as a continental expanse, has rendered problematic the use of the term as a purely analytical referent (2015, 2).

Much of the scholarly literature on Eurasia focuses on, and draws meaning from, one of three areas of inquiry: geopolitical control; discursive and symbolic claims; and bio-political administration.[13] Our analytical framework for examining borderlands through a Eurasian lens thus draws upon each of these dimensions. By combining these three dimensions in a single analytical framework and examining ways in which they intersect and overlap in practice, we gain a multilayered view, one that transcends, but does not exclude, the state system. For example, our field of vision might include at once the intersection of Soviet symbolism and discourse, administrative measures meant to include populations living in the borderlands of neighboring states, and economic interests as expressed in pipelines.

The geopolitical domain encompasses a wide range of elements, including economic relations—trade, exchange, regulatory arrangements, and organizations such as the Eurasian Economic Union (see Makarychev

2015, 2). It also may include analysis of ideology expressed through policy, as in Ukraine's eastern border with Russia, where more highly politicized meanings of "Eurasia" (in English, "Eurasianist," as opposed to "Eurasian") have come to take on additional significance in the context of the war in the Donbas (Popescu 2014). In order to capture political geography and power in all of its dimensions, we consider the geopolitical in intersection with bio-political control and discursive and symbolic domains.

Eurasia as a discursive and symbolic construct is deeply intertwined with geopolitics and bio-political control, as well as its relationship with the Soviet and pre-Soviet past. Here, we consider the creation of historical memory; practices of mourning and commemoration; and the discursive and symbolic reintegration of selective elements of the Soviet past.[14] It also includes the use of Eurasia as a philosophical principle and counterweight to representations of the idea of Europe (Zhurzhenko 2010, 59; Laruelle 2015, 3).

A close examination of practices of bio-political control offers an alternative to the cliché of the demise of the territorialized nation-state, permitting us to continue to take the state seriously (Agnew 2009) even amidst a global context of increased mobility (Maier 2000; Sassen 2008). Here, borderland residents obtain financial, bureaucratic, citizenship, technological, and other support through two sets of institutions: state bureaucracies, which provide rights and entitlements variously based on citizenship, ethnicity, or linguistic identity; and religious organizations, which increasingly define the boundaries of political communities based upon faith-based affiliation (Makarychev 2015, 3–4).

In the following paragraphs, we show how using this analytical framework, an image of the Ukraine–EU and Russia–China borderlands comes into view that is distinct from that conjured through the conceptual lens post-Soviet: viewed through a Eurasian lens, these borderlands, while heritors of a single former state, are places where authority and territoriality are instantiated in radically different ways.[15] While the Sino-Russian demarcation organizes space such that the demarcated border, even in its multiplicity, more or less corresponds to the lived boundaries of national communities, the physical demarcation between the EU and Ukraine involves a more complex, overlapping, and potentially unstable set of sovereignties.

Such a conclusion might seem only logical, even obvious: state boundaries in Eastern Europe shifted numerous times in the twentieth century, and ethnic irredenta are everywhere on the continent. However, the discussion below pertains not merely to the presence of multiple nationalities in the same national space, but also, in the case of the southwestern borderlands of former Soviet space, the presence of more than one state authority in a single territory. Further, what we wish to highlight here is not only the fact of multiple and overlapping authorities in the same space, but also the fact that, in our view, this complexity is rendered more visible when viewed through a Eurasian lens.

Eurasia as a Geopolitical Domain

At first glance, the Russia–China and Ukraine–EU borderlands appear to exhibit important similarities. In particular, they share a feature characteristic of many other contemporary spaces that are home to international boundaries: the interstate border as it is lived is broader than its demarcation. The lived demarcation extends into national interiors, where it takes the form of visa and passport checkpoints; it is anywhere that police with the right to demand identity documents may be.

However, when we examine economic relations at the ground level, a deep divide emerges. In the Sino-Russian borderlands, markers of national identity and economic activity closely track the boundaries of sovereign territory. Along the southwestern border of Ukraine, however, multiple signs of overlap are visible, together with the economic integration of populations living on supposedly discrete national territories. As will become apparent in the following pages, despite the comparative poverty of Ukraine's southwestern borderlands, their human terrain shares features characteristic of Ukraine's eastern edge prior to the formal rise of secessionist movements and Russian military intervention in the Donbas (Pisano 2008).

In the environs of Heihe-Blagoveshchensk, people and goods are channeled into nationally defined space both within and around the demarcated border. This begins with the border passage itself: two bus companies, one Chinese and one Russian, ply the ice in the winter months, segregating passengers by passport. Only Chinese may take the Chinese bus, and Russian citizens must ride the Russian bus. By law, third-country nationals must traverse the border on the Russian bus.[16] Once across, the spatial organization of cross-border trade and labor largely confines Chinese to particular areas of Russian territory, and vice versa. Apart from university spaces on both sides of the demarcation, where Russian and Chinese students occupy more integrated spaces, production and commerce segregate some populations of workers and traders. Former collective farms on

Russian territory isolate Chinese labor on rural territory,[17] while Chinese traders seeking to bypass trade tariffs hire highly organized brigades of Russian *fonari* ("lanterns") and *kirpichi* ("bricks") who use their legal allowance of personal goods to transport commodities across the border[18] (also see Ryzhova 2004, 7) and barely interact with people on Chinese territory. Iwashita (2004, 149) describes lanterns' passage: upon arrival in China, they collect parcels of goods in a building within the free-trade zone of Daheihe and "immediately return" to Blagoveshchensk. Here, transborder exchange appears to contribute not so much to hybridity as to the continual reification of national belonging and nationalization of the periphery on both riverbanks.

In contrast, on the Ukraine–EU border, mechanisms of surveillance intended to make the border a bulwark protecting Europe from the east have instead encouraged transnational exchange, leading to the dilution of national identities that had been cultivated in the post-Soviet period (Simonyi and Pisano 2011). Here, regulation of goods and human flows work at cross-purposes, blurring relationships between identity, territory, and sovereignty: stringent EU and Schengen regulations protect European agricultural markets from Ukrainian goods and European labor markets from Ukrainian people, while neighboring countries have granted some form of legal status to Ukrainian citizens possessing the right prerequisites (see also Skumin 2013; Artman 2011). However, because of the rising risks associated with discovery by Ukrainian authorities, the increasing numbers of people who take advantage of such opportunities also seek to conceal their status. For researchers, a clear view of the extent of such phenomena requires long-term immersion or reliance on the (possibly inflated) claims of external national homelands (Brubaker 1996).

Eurasia as a Discursive Field

On the Sino-Russian border at Heihe-Blagoveshchensk, traces of historical Russian presence can be found as far as Harbin, the capital of Heilongjiang, some 570 kilometers away. However, the history of Russian presence translates today as touristic space: with few exceptions, symbols such as the Saint Sophia Orthodox cathedral, today a museum, and the monument to Soviet soldiers function as artifacts rather than parts of living culture. Several years ago, a municipal project in Heihe highlighted this fact: believing they were undertaking a positive action,[19] officials in Heihe installed trash receptacles painted as Russian nested dolls. The story made national news in Russia, and Russians in the region at first interpreted the action as deeply offensive (e.g. see Amurinfo 2007). Frictions between the populations on either side of the border exist, but do not abound. And despite periodic expressions of concern emanating from Moscow or from opportunistic local politicians about Chinese immigrants filling a demographic vacuum on the Russian side (Kucera 2010; Alexseev 2001, 122–123), neither city shows traces of overt ideological confrontation based on essentialist claims to territory.[20]

In contrast, in Ukraine, near the demarcated border with Slovakia, Hungary, and Romania, symbolic representations of Hungarian national identity densely punctuate rural settlements.[21] Spaces saturated by Hungarian symbols and commemorations give way to dominantly Ukrainian cultural space only dozens of kilometers to the east and north. In this context, the symbols and practices in question include not only affirmations of minority identity within a modern, multiethnic and multicultural state, but also symbols of Hungarian statehood. While events such as the Turul Madár celebrations, which attract Hungarian-speaking Ukrainians, Hungarian nationals, and Rusyns to a site outside the village of Tiszaujlak every July, straddle a border between expressions of a minority culture and claims of an external state, other practices less ambiguously articulate affiliation with the state of Hungary.

In the strings of historically Magyar settlements lining the demarcated border, statues of St. István, King of Hungary, stand outside village churches and Hungarian flags fly from government—usually village council—buildings. In local parlance, the flags are both sign of “magyarság,” or magyarness, and an expression of allegiance to the only state that is present to local residents in any way that helps them overcome the challenges of everyday life.[22] Village celebrations begin with unison singing of the Hungarian national anthem, followed by vague humming of the Ukrainian anthem, accompanied by a recording, before a stage on which both flags are displayed. In one village, a large Hungarian flag adorns the altar of the Lutheran church (see Simonyi 2013, 98).

Places where Hungarian state symbols command the contemporary landscape extend as far as hundred kilometers into the interior, where a monument at Verecke Pass in the Carpathian mountains—the site of a mid-twentieth century massacre of Ukrainian fighters against Hungarian occupation, as well as a commemoration of the passage of Árpád leading the seven tribes into the Carpathian basin around 895—is an ongoing site of confrontations between ethnic Ukrainians and Magyars (see also Stroschein 2012).

The main Hungarian-language newspaper of the Ukrainian borderlands uses the historical Hungarian administrative name of the region in its title (Kárpátalja), and some villagers prefer this designation to the Ukrainian name of the region (Zakarpattia) when they address their mail. In recent years, churches and cemeteries have become host to monuments to local soldiers who fought in the Hungarian army during World War II. In the same territory, schools and other state institutions with unfunded mandates display posters in Ukrainian, and border guards, often from Ukraine's eastern borderland regions, speak Russian or Ukrainian. So attenuated are feelings of belonging to—and so strong feelings of abandonment by—the Ukrainian state among parts of the rural Magyar population that vernacular descriptions of the border locate it somewhere far away: Hungarian speakers in Ukraine often refer to "Ukraine" as an entity removed in space, as in "they came from Ukraine" to the village to buy cows last spring.[23]

Timekeeping practices likewise highlight ways that some populations in Ukraine's southwest borderlands, through the fabric of their daily routines, orient their lives toward an external national homeland. Timekeeping in Ukraine has been both object of parliamentary debate and a locus of intense contestation over national identity and state control. The symbolic valence of the Ukrainian Trade Unions Federation building on Kyiv's Maidan, which burned during demonstrations in February 2014, resided partially in its clock tower, a daily symbol and reminder of Russian influence in the years when it displayed Moscow time.

In and around Chop, the boundaries of time zones are not coextensive with the boundaries of the Ukrainian state. People of different ethnicities live according to the time zone of their choice: except for state offices which observe the time zone of the Ukrainian capital, businesses post their hours according to the time zones of both Kyiv and Budapest. People who speak mainly Hungarian, and people who live in the nearby mountains, tend to operate according to clocks set one hour earlier, to Budapest time, than the Kyiv time Ukrainian speakers use. Hungarian speakers often label their choice of time zone with reference to the Hungarian capital, whereas others describe their zone as "mountain time" (use of the earlier time zone is better attuned to agricultural rhythms in shadowed alpine contexts) or "local time." Conversations among members of different ethnic groups regarding an appointment, meeting or other time-dependent event thus require explicit specification and negotiation of the time zone to be used. The everyday practice of Kyiv time, and the imaginary boundary that traces its actual use in the present day, occurs further to the east, far from the demarcated border (see also Simonyi and Pisano 2011).

These practices contrast with the marking of time in Heihe and Blagoveshchensk. There, time zone difference between the two sides of the river follows the demarcation line without local adaptations on either side: the border clearly divides two nationally inscribed territories at the demarcation line, and communication between Russian and Chinese people on either side proceeds according to the terms of nationally inscribed territory—Russian tourists in Heihe have no plausible claim to operating according to Blagoveshchensk clocks.

Eurasia as a Space of Bio-Political Control

Along the Sino-Russian border, bio-political control of populations today roughly follows the demarcated border[24]: apart from the fluvial islands and a small free-trade area, the Chinese government is the only national entity to make claims on its territory in this area, and the Russian Federation is the only entity that governs its territory. Far more Russians cross the border than Chinese (Zaionchkovskaya et al. 2014, 229), mainly to participate in shuttle trade. Russian pensioners economize by living in cheaper apartments in Heihe and renting out their own flats, but obtaining Chinese citizenship is not a realistic possibility for most. Meanwhile, even at the height of hysteria about Chinese "colonization" in Russia during the mid-1990s, only fifty Chinese citizens had received Russian residence permits during the previous decade (Skosyrev 1995). By 2008, less than one-third of the Chinese nationals who immigrated to Russia lived in the regions along the 4000 kilometers of the demarcation (Zaionchkovskaya et al. 2014, 226).

In the Ukraine–EU borderlands, the fit between presumed states and territorialized subjects is substantially less clear.[25] In Hungary, political parties frame programs extending citizenship to Ukrainians as attempts at historical justice for populations left outside of Hungary after the 1920 Treaty of Trianon at the end of World War I. These essentialist discourses are national in origin and based on historical attachments to territory; they do not emanate from the EU but extend policy into territory adjacent to it.[26]

Despite the force of accompanying rhetoric, Hungarian policies regarding ethnic Magyars in Ukraine and surrounding countries do not translate into territorial claims in a traditional sense. However, in recent years, they have placed Hungarian citizens on the territory of the Ukrainian state. The Hungarian government claims that since the 2011 implementation of Act XLIV on Hungarian Nationality (2010),[27] nearly 100,000 people permanently residing in the Ukrainian borderlands have received Hungarian citizenship.[28] They may vote in Hungarian elections and, in certain cases, receive pensions and welfare benefits.

To the extent that Ukraine enforces a prohibition on dual citizenship, those individuals relinquish their Ukrainian citizenship and become Hungarian citizens populating Ukrainian territory. Further, people in Ukraine who can demonstrate Magyar parentage receive Hungarian government subsidies for children and other welfare benefits through the local Kápátaljai Magyar Kulturális Szövetség (KMKSz). The Ukrainian borderlands of the EU thus have become territory that is home to concentrations of people with allegiance, however instrumentalized it may be, to a neighboring country.[29] These practices blur and reshape the border as it is lived and practiced by many: in this sense, its contours do not trace the demarcated line, but shift it eastward, following social contours of allegiances.

There is, of course, nothing unusual about the presence of ethnic minorities on the territory of any state. What is unusual here, and what bears increasing resemblance to situations in the Donbas and Crimea and in Georgia in the first decade of the twenty-first century (e.g. Artman 2011), is the permanent residence of large numbers of former Ukrainian citizens, now passport-bearing citizens of another state, on the territory of Ukraine.

The role of religious orthodoxy likewise highlights distinctions between the two borderlands. In China, the Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate is present only on the order of a moribund historical artifact: after two centuries of timid development in China, the Orthodox Church became independent of the Moscow Patriarchate in 1956 after the Chinese Revolution. Following the repression of the Cultural Revolution and the death of the last Bishop, Vasily (Chuan) of Beijing in 1962, Chinese Orthodoxy fell into disaffection. To this date, China recognizes five religions: Buddhism, Catholicism, Islam, Protestantism, and Taoism; the refusal to recognize the Orthodox Church is seen as a protection against Russian influence on Chinese territory.[30]

In contrast, the Ukraine–EU borderlands are home to a more complex landscape of faith-based affiliations. The political alliance between the current Kremlin and the Russian Orthodox Church has become a central element redefining contemporary Russian identity (Koesel 2014, 145), and the Ukrainian interior has become a battleground between the Moscow and Kyiv Patriarchates (Kumkova 2015). Further, the borderland with the EU involves additional religious actors: in addition to the claims to legitimacy (and real estate) advanced by both Patriarchates, other churches transcend and crosscut society in different ways. Of these, the Greek Catholic Church is the most diverse, integrating multiple linguistic and cultural groups, from Magyarophones on the borders of Hungary to Ukrainophones in the region of Lviv, each with their own traditions, western and eastern (Naumescu 2006, 17; but see Himka 2009). Roman Catholic and Lutheran Reformist denominations are oriented toward Europe—traditionally, culturally, linguistically and financially. Finally, recent years have seen a noticeable increase in the activities of additional denominations, namely Baptists and Jehova's Witnesses, which appeal through their closeness and practicality, simpler hierarchical structure, and direct action to people in need (Simonyi 2013). Further east, this complexity dissolves into bipolarity, leaving the battlefield largely to the Moscow and Kyivan patriarchates. In the Ukraine–EU borderlands, rather than clear separation or coherence across the interstate demarcation, religious affiliation crosscuts the boundaries of national and linguistic communities.[31]

The limits of the territory in which Hungarian citizens reside are coextensive neither with Hungary's border with Ukraine, nor with EU or Schengen boundaries. Here, we might imagine the straight line that represents the demarcated border between Ukraine and the EU and Schengen, on the one hand, and a wending trail that delimits the territory upon which the state of Hungary claims citizens further to the east. This trail does not track the territory upon which ethnic Magyars in Ukraine live, as far from all ethnic Magyars in the area have taken Hungarian citizenship. Further, the trail that traces the location of citizens may move as remittance labor brings people westward. We might imagine similar scenarios to the southeast in the cases of Romania and other EU states which extend citizenship rights to Ukrainians.

Conclusion

We found that the use of post-Soviet as an heuristic shaped our vision to highlight shared characteristics of these two borderlands and a clear distinction between post-Soviet space and space beyond the historical Soviet border. Our use of Eurasia as an analytical lens, however, exposed the extent to which the demarcated border in these two places tracked—or did not track—spaces and practices of identity and sovereignty. The use of a Eurasian lens showed us both the conventional character of the Sino-Russian border at Heihe-Blagoveshchensk, which even in its multiplicity clearly separates sovereign national spaces, and the current dislocation between social, political, and economic boundaries at Ukraine's south-western edge.

In the case of the Ukraine–EU borderlands, the lens "Eurasia" further highlighted multivalent demarcations and borders regimes in play: the boundaries of the Schengen agreement and of EU regulatory regimes do not coincide with the geopolitical, bio-political, and discursive iterations of national borders as defined through the policies of Hungary, Romania, Slovakia, and Poland—or with the responses of Ukrainian citizens to those policies.[32]

The chapter shows how the kinds of borders we see depend very much on which concepts we use to see them. If seeing borders as post-Soviet guides us toward shared experience and historical residue, seeing them as Eurasian grants us a better view on *where* sovereignty may be waning. As other contributions to this volume likewise show, borders do not do the same work everywhere, and sovereignty is not equally weak or fluid in all borderlands of former Soviet space.

In recent years, separatist movements and their foreign sponsors have leveraged the complex sovereignty in certain borderlands to challenge the location of demarcated borders. In this regional context, as the concepts "Eurasia" and even "post-Soviet" are re-appropriated into the narratives of political elites, we highlight the need for awareness of the analytical implications of choosing one conceptual rubric over the other. We also emphasize that, as categories of analysis, both concepts—post-Soviet and Eurasia—must be explicitly framed in analytical terms in order to differentiate them from their ideological homologues that are categories of practice (see Brubaker and Cooper 2000). In this sense, neither term is unproblematic: if the use of post-Soviet as an organizing concept risks reifying former Soviet territory as an analytic category, the use of Eurasia as an analytic category suggests other risks. Marlene Laruelle writes, "[t]he more "Eurasia" invades Russia's public space, popular culture, and state-produced narratives in Russia, the more forgetful of Eurasianist founding ideologists it seems to be" (Laruelle 2015, 5).[33]

Our findings highlight the need for scholars' awareness of the analytical implications of choosing one conceptual rubric over the other. If thinking—and seeing—with post-Soviet eyes flattens some aspects of borderlands analysis and may help reproduce the idea of borders as unchallenged physical boundaries between states, thinking with "Eurasia" can help expose the dislocation or the coherence of a demarcation line. This concept, used as the lens through which we observe and compare these borderlands, highlighted nuances that, in our analysis, post-Soviet did not lead us to see.

In the social sciences, conversations about borders and borderlands are framed within a set number of concepts concerning idea of states and the demarcations separating them. Our fieldwork-based analysis of these two borderlands shows that reifying borders and borderlands through an analytic point of departure carries a risk of distorting and veiling larger phenomena at play. This highlights the relationship between initial research premises and presuppositions and the object or objects of investigation. How should we define our starting point for investigation of the edges of polities? If we do not ask this question, we risk being drawn toward the dangerous presupposition that the edges of Eurasia or post-Soviet space are borders that do demarcations' traditional work.

We require ways to operationalize in analysis, in a systematic way, the separations, frictions, and zones of conflict that do not follow clear demarcations. In this chapter, our use of Eurasia as an analytical tool, rather than drawing our attention to those clear demarcations called borders, helped us highlight overlapping relationships between territory and various authorities.

However, the concept Eurasia also propels our attention toward an imaginary that could be a mirage obscuring other dimensions of complexity: population flows, environmental challenges, technological advances, and economic and financial realities, for example. Here, Oushakine's (2000) post-Soviet aphasia returns to afflict the social sciences: none of the words in our shared repertoire describe adequately the ways in which the edges of polities meet, and we find ourselves in a conceptual void that urgently requires the attention of scholars. The edges of Eurasia are partly border, partly frontier, partly shatter zone—but none of these entirely.[34]

If social scientists cannot rely on existing concepts and their definitions—whether due to their provenance or to their awkward fit with phenomena in the contemporary world—what is the proper starting point for investigation? How might we go about identifying the objects of our analysis? Beyond the integration of a set of conceptual tools, we require iterative processes in research that create space for questioning existing conceptual apparatuses while more firmly anchoring our analyses in lived experience.

This analysis also suggests implications for the study of borders beyond post-Soviet or Eurasian space. Consideration of the multiple domains through which states attempt to instantiate sovereignty—whether through direct control over territory or control of populations—illuminates places in borderlands where borders are multiple and dislocated. In such areas, demarcations between states do not represent all claims, conflicts, or frictions of potential significance for state sovereignty. Analytical emphasis on demarcated interstate boundaries may thus obscure other, incipient forms of separation—some of which are the focus of other contributions to this volume.

Finally, salient fissures—with possibly deep future consequences—may occur elsewhere than in the demarcation line. If scholarly research is to contribute to the anticipation and identification of such fissures, we require attention to the content and field of vision afforded by the concepts we use.

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NOTES

1. In both borderlands, the research for this chapter included structured and unstructured interviews, informal conversations, collection and analysis of visual material, and analysis of local press.

In the Ukraine–EU borderlands, this included long-term fieldwork and extended participant-observation research in villages and towns within two kilometers of the demarcation, as well as visits to every crossing point along Ukraine's official border with Slovakia and Hungary and several crossing points on its border with Romania. We crossed the demarcated border on foot, car, bicycle, and train, in some places, on dozens of occasions (also Simonyi and Pisano 2011). Our fieldwork in the Ukraine–EU borderlands included multiple sites, with research trips lasting from a few weeks to several months nearly every year since 2004. There, we interacted with our interlocutors in Hungarian, standard and local dialects of Ukrainian, and Russian.

In and around Heihe-Blagoveshchensk, our research was far more limited, including interviews in the two cities as well as conversations in Xunke, a town with a border crossing two hours by bus from Heihe, four Han and Manchu villages within an hour's travel of Heihe, and in the city of Harbin. We conducted preliminary field research in this borderland over a three-week period in February 2010, with further extensive conversations with one interlocutor on several occasions in subsequent years. In China, we relied upon the assistance of an interpreter who translated from Mandarin into Russian. We acknowledge the asymmetry in the research presented here and welcome feedback.

2. For example, a post-EU accession opening near the border settlements of Beregsurány-Asztély supported flourishing commerce until it was closed abruptly leaving local vendors bemoaning that "before we ate salami, now bread and butter". Oral Testimony (OT), Asztély, 22 June 2008.
3. For a comprehensive treatment of Russian sources on nineteenth-century relations between the two countries, see Timofeev (2003).
4. Discussions on this subject included a meeting with researchers working on Sino-Mongolian and Sino-Russian borders, Graduate Institute of Russian Studies, Heilongjiang University, Harbin, 4 February 2010.
5. See Chari and Verdery (2009).
6. See Péteri on discourses of systemic relativism (2006, 6).
7. Interview with Yu-hai Gao, director and researcher, Development Research Center of People's Government of Heilongjiang Province, International Economic and Trade Section, 4 February 2010.

8. According to a Russian customs official. Field notes, Blagoveshchensk, 20 February 2010.
9. For examples of this sociality, see Sorokin's (1985) novelistic rendition of Soviet practices associated with standing in lines. It bears noting that while the origins of this sociality could be located in the Soviet period, it also may resonate in a far more distant past, in the divergent trajectories of western and eastern Christianity—and the former's emphasis on text and the Augustinian injunction to "Take up and read."
10. The widespread renaming of scientific institutes and organizations reflects this shift.
11. For scholarly analysis, see Bassin (2014), Bassin, Glebov, and Laruelle (2015), Clowes (2011), and Laruelle (2015).
12. See Dugin (2000, 2002, 2004).
13. The rich literature on Eurasia and Eurasianism offers many possible angles for analysis. This framework draws explicitly upon the work of Zhurzhenko (2010), Laruelle (2015), who focuses on geopolitical, philosophical, and commemorative dimensions; Makarychev (2015), who focuses on geopolitical and biopolitical dimensions; and Rieber (2014).
14. This may include the return of Stalin to some public commemorations. See recent discussions about the inclusion of Stalin in monument on Moscow's Poklonnaia (e.g. Ozerova 2015).
15. For a discussion of authority and territoriality versus sovereignty, see Ansell and DiPalma (2004).
16. Field notes, Heihe-Blagoveshchensk, 20 February 2010. We learned of this rule by violating it: we had purchased tickets on and boarded the Chinese bus. Once it was ascertained we did not carry Russian passports, we were permitted to continue.
17. Such flows are driven not by demographic pressure, as is often suggested in political discourse in Moscow, but by rural land–labor ratios and successful agricultural policies on the Chinese side, which have resulted in a tractor in every courtyard, freeing members of rural households for participation in cross-border seasonal labor migration. Field notes, multiple visits to village households in Heihe environs, February 2010; meeting with local scholars, University of Heihe, 7 February 2010. See also Ryzhova and Ioffe (2009) and Ryzhova (2009) regarding the shape of economic exchange.

18. Field notes, Blagoveshchensk border crossing, February 2010. See Ryzhova (2004, 362) on "ex-polar market structures that transcend the national frontiers" and Asmol'skaia (2008) on visa regimes.
19. Numerous Chinese and Russian interlocutors in the region articulated this aspect of the episode to us in 2010.
20. But see Bassin (1999) and Iwashita (2004) on the history of territorial claims along the Amur-Heilongjiang.
21. The use of these symbols has intensified significantly in the past decade, even as, for reasons of outmigration and road infrastructure development, the boundaries between Ukrainian and Magyar cultural space have shifted. See Pisano (2009).
22. For an extended discussion of everyday security in this borderland and local implementation of the various entitlement programs offered by the Hungarian state, see Simonyi (2013).
23. OT, Kisszelmenc, 24 May 2004.
24. But see Wolff (1999) on early-twentieth-century populations in and around Harbin.
25. This section treats Hungary's policies. Romania, Slovakia, and Poland also implement policies that grant rights to Ukrainians of certain ethnic origins. We do not address those here.
26. *Hungary: Act LXII of 2001 on Hungarians Living in Neighbouring Countries* [Hungary], 1 January 2002, available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/3f460e764.html [accessed 29 August 2015].
27. Act XLIV of 2010 amending Act LV of 1993 on the Hungarian Nationality, 26 May 2010; Bozoki (2013).
28. Out of a regional population of 1.2 million, last officially enumerated in 2001—a figure almost certainly lower today (Mukachev 2015). Romania engages in similar practices in Bukovina (Bukinfo 2015).
29. Ukraine does not permit dual citizenship; many people hold it nonetheless, though low-level public servants cannot in practice. In these borderlands, enforcement is strict. See Delano (2011) on welfare benefits to nationals abroad in the Mexican context.
30. On the history of Russian Orthodoxy on Chinese territory, see Ipatova (1998), Paderin (1998), and Popov (2000).
31. Joyce (2014) documents similar complexities along Poland's border with Belarussia.

32. Raffaella DelSarto (2010) has found similar dynamics of contradiction in overlapping border regimes at the southern boundary of the EU.
33. She continues, “The production of ideas, their agents, and places of production should thus be given more attention. We need to examine the deployment of terms and their operationalization before taking a restraining shortcut of conflating metapolitics with state strategies” (Laruelle 2015, 5).
34. See e.g., Sahlins (1991) and Bartov and Weitz (2013).

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